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RELEASE AS REMEDY FOR EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT
ALEXANDER A. REINERT*
ABSTRACT
Although the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and
unusual” punishment means different things in different contexts, it
plainly forecloses state and federal actors from choosing ex ante to
impose a punishment that is either disproportionate or inconsistent
with minimum standards of decency. In other words, the Eighth
Amendment mandates that no punishment be imposed if the only
other choice on the table is an unconstitutional punishment.
Although this principle can be gleaned from the disparate strands of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, its remedial consequence has not
been fully implemented. In this Article, I propose that providing a
remedy of release from custody, or a reduction in sentence, for certain
kinds of Eighth Amendment violations is the best way to make fully
operational this Eighth Amendment principle.
Put simply, the problem is this: there are three different remedial
schemes for an Eighth Amendment violation, based on both the type
of Eighth Amendment violation challenged and the timing of the
violation. When a prisoner challenges a sentence prior to its imposi-
tion through proportionality analysis, courts have the power to strike
the sentence down and order the release of an offender. When a
prisoner challenges conditions of confinement that are ongoing in
nature, the court has the power to order the cessation of those
conditions or, in extreme cases, to order the release of prisoners. But
when a prisoner challenges the infliction of past punishment, the
prisoner may obtain only monetary damages.
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This Article argues that if discrete instances of abuse are consid-
ered punishment and the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposi-
tion of disproportionate or inhumane punishment, then there is no
logical or doctrinal reason to limit the remedy for past violations to
damages only. Some punishments, even if inflicted on only one
occasion, can be so horrific so as to themselves amount to unconstitu-
tional punishment. To continue to incarcerate an offender in that
instance is to subject the prisoner to a total amount of punishment
that is unconstitutional. When the State has no legitimate authority
to impose additional punishment on the prisoner, the remedy of
release, or a commensurate reduction in total length of imprison-
ment, should be considered.
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INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and
unusual punishment.”1 Unsurprisingly, the term means different
things in different contexts. Thus, for challenges to conditions
experienced within prison—a range of cases that encompasses
claims such as overcrowding, excessive use of force, and failure to
provide adequate medical care—a prisoner must show that a
particular prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind to deprive the prisoner of an objectively serious need.2 If an
official has acted with that state of mind, he is thought to have
violated minimum standards of civilized treatment.3 But, for
challenges to the imposition of criminal sentences, courts conduct a
loose proportionality analysis that compares the severity of the
sentence with the seriousness of the criminal offense of incarcera-
tion.4 In both sets of cases, although courts purport to review a
“punishment” for its conformity with the Eighth Amendment,
different standards are applied to reach an ultimate resolution. I
have argued before that there are good reasons to question whether
proportionality and conditions of confinement doctrine should be
separate strands of analysis as to substantive Eighth Amendment
doctrine.5 Here, I address a difficult remedial question: whether
there should be a stark difference in the available remedies based
on the timing and nature of each Eighth Amendment violation.
Take prison rape as an example. It is estimated that 20 percent
of prisoners serving life sentences will be sexually assaulted in
prison, some by other prisoners and some by staff.6 Despite the
common-sense intuition that rape in prison is not meant to be part
of an offender’s sentence, for many offenders the reality is far from
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 82-84, 88; infra note 100 and accompanying text.
3. See infra text accompanying note 88.
4. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
5. See Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement
Litigation Benefit from Proportionality Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53 (2009).
6. See Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane
Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 125-26 (2007); see also
Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 178 (D. Mass. 2009) (commenting on the widespread
awareness of the problem of sexual assault by staff and other prisoners).
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ideal. Similarly, individual cases, independent studies, and
anecdotal reports are replete with accounts of a range of inhumane
treatment—staff beatings, failure to provide medical or mental
health care, indifference, or worse, to the daily threat of violence
from other offenders—suffered by prisoners as a result of staff
misconduct and supervisory malfeasance.7 Most challenges to such
treatment, however, recognize only the possibility of a damages
remedy as compensation for unconstitutional treatment. The
remedy of release from custody is a potential remedy only if the
State proposes to inflict such punishment in the future through a
sentencing proceeding or through ongoing policies, practices, or
customs.8 This Article argues that, contrary to current practice,
offenders should be able to pursue the remedy of release from
custody, or a reduction in overall length of sentence, after they have
been subjected to abusive treatment.
Under current Eighth Amendment doctrine, such a result would
appear to be radical but is, in fact, consistent with basic principles
present in discrete strands of Eighth Amendment analysis. Thus,
under Eighth Amendment proportionality doctrine, which governs
statutorily enacted punishment schemes before they are carried out,
there would be no room for a sentencing regime that proposed
punishing convicted prisoners through, say, sexual assault. Any
state that intended to pursue such a punishment regime without
7. Courts, legislators, and others have recognized the problem of sexual assault in prison.
See, e.g., Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, § 2, 117 Stat. 972 (making
findings regarding the problem of sexual abuse in prison); Daskalea v. District of Columbia,
227 F.3d 433, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding
sexual assault); ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS
REPORTED BY INMATES, 2007, at 2 (rev. Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/svsfpri07.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS
70 (2001). But many other deleterious conditions of confinement have been documented
through litigation and other avenues. See, e.g., Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-
0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351 TEH, 2009 WL 2407404, at *3 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Aug. 4,
2009) (making findings of fact regarding unconstitutional conditions of confinement); Sharon
Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 887-
89 & nn.18-23 (2009) (discussing chronic overcrowding, threats to health and physical well-
being, and other recurring problems in prison conditions); Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor
of Cal., Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation (Oct. 4, 2006), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278.
8. See infra Part IV.A.
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compromise would be forced to abandon it or forfeit the ability to
punish entirely. Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
doctrine, which regulates systemic and ongoing conditions of
confinement, recognizes that a prison system that systematically
exposes prisoners to a high risk of sexual assault from guards or
other prisoners must be remedied through injunctive relief,
including prisoner release in some cases.9 Just as with sentencing
challenges, if a state chose to continue to expose prisoners to a high
risk of future sexual abuse, it would do so at the risk of losing its
ability to punish entirely—at least for a subset of offenders. Even
sentencing judges have recognized, albeit not explicitly on constitu-
tional grounds, that criminal defendants who experience extremely
harsh conditions of confinement—including sexual abuse—while
awaiting sentence should not be sentenced as harshly as prisoners
who face typical conditions of confinement.10 In other words, if the
judge knows at the moment of sentencing that a prisoner already
has experienced abuse at the hands of the State, it will be trans-
lated into an earlier release.11 All of these different areas of
jurisprudence establish that a government may not, ex ante,
affirmatively choose to impose an unconstitutional punishment on
an offender. If the State intends to do so, then release is the only
remedy that will ensure the enforcement of the Constitution. I argue
here that this is so because release is the only remedy that will
ensure, when possible, that the punishment received by an offender
not amount to inhumane treatment or unconstitutionally excessive
punishment.
The question remains as to why the same kind of analysis should
not be applied when the extremely harsh and unlawful conduct
occurs after a sentence has been imposed by a judge but before a
judge has had an opportunity to reorder the state prison system so
that egregious instances of abuse will not happen. In other words,
is it sensible to limit the remedy of release to only those situations
9. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently recognized that release from custody may be an
appropriate remedy even for prisoners who themselves are not harmed by ongoing
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1940 (2011).
10. See infra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
11. As discussed below, even when a presentence detainee is subjected to abuse by a
different sovereign than the sentencing sovereign, judges may take that fact into account in
arriving at a just sentence. See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
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in which the unconstitutional conduct will occur in the future or
when violations occur prior to sentencing but not to instances in
which the Constitution has been violated after sentencing? I argue
in this Article that when unconstitutional treatment within prisons
is dispensed as a result of governmental policies, customs, or
practices,12 or as a result of discrete instances of abuse, the remedial
gap is unjustified and release should be a potential remedy whether
the treatment is only threatened in the future or already adminis-
tered.13 Just as in the ex ante cases, providing a remedy for release
in the ex post cases ensures that an offender is not subject to a total
amount of punishment that is inhumane or excessive. This approach
unites disparate strands of Eighth Amendment analysis to produce
a unified approach to limiting punishment by the State.14
This Article considers for the first time why this unified treat-
ment is necessary. Although the Supreme Court has recognized
that abusive treatment at the hands of corrections officers and
their supervisors constitutes “punishment” under the Eighth
Amendment, even when it is not authorized by law,15 release has
never been embraced as an appropriate remedy for past unconstitu-
tional or excessive punishment by such individuals. As a result,
governments that contemplate inflicting unconstitutional punish-
ment in the future, either explicitly by statute or implicitly through
policy or practice, are forced to choose between imposing a solely
constitutional punishment or imposing no punishment at all.16 By
contrast, states, through their actors, that impose discrete instances
of unconstitutional punishment may continue to impose statutorily
prescribed punishment even after prisoners have suffered what
would be considered excessive punishment under any of the various
strands of Eighth Amendment analysis. These states are not forced
to make a choice once the punishment has been imposed. Thus,
some prisoners are regularly exposed to excessive and unconstitu-
12. Sharon Dolovich has referred to some of these conditions as institutional cruelty.
Dolovich, supra note 7, at 893.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
14. The vast majority of offenders are incarcerated in state prisons, but I use “State”
interchangeably with “government” for the purposes of this Article. Whether imposed by
federal or state officials, all criminal punishment is regulated by the Eighth Amendment.
15. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910).
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tional punishments and are limited in remedy simply because of the
timing and nature of the Eighth Amendment violation.
Not only has this remedial question been overlooked in doctrine,
it also has not been the focus of punishment philosophy. Most pun-
ishment theorists do not address the question of the proper remedy
for unjust or unjustifiable punishment.17 Some only offhandedly
dismiss the possibility of a release remedy as the bogeyman at the
bottom of the slippery slope of the “subjectivist” approach to pun-
ishment.18 Similarly, academic commentary on Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence has historically focused on tweaking each particular
doctrinal area rather than trying to bridge the differences between
these strands of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.19 In the area of
17. Adam Kolber, for instance, has suggested that consequentialists and retributivists
must take account of the fact that prisoners experience prison in subjectively different ways
by making front-end modifications to sentences, not by using the Eighth Amendment to
provide the remedy of release. See Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 236 (2009) [hereinafter Kolber, Subjective Experience]. In a
forthcoming article, Kolber briefly discusses problems with monetary compensation through
the lens of distinguishing intentional from unintentional punishment, but he does not focus
on the remedial gap that is the focus of this Article. See Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional
Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Kolber, Unintentional
Punishment].
18. See David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1650-51 (2010); Dan
Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive
Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 961 (2010). These authors argue that abusive prison conditions
do not constitute “punishment” and therefore cannot be the basis for “wholesale punishment
discounts.” Dan Markel, Chad Flanders & David C. Gray, Beyond Experience: Getting
Retributive Justice Right, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 605, 619-20 (2011). Instead, they argue that such
abuse, whether caused by state officials or other prisoners, should be remedied through other
means, such as the criminal law. Id. at 622. At the same time, however, they accept that
prison conditions could be so degrading that a state may forfeit its right to punish a particular
offender. Id. at 620 n.46; Markel & Flanders, supra, at 961 n.193. Below, I explain how these
views may be consistent with the remedy proposed in this Article.
19. See Lisa Krim, A Reasonable Woman’s Version of Cruel and Unusual Punishment:
Cross-Gender, Clothed-Body Searches of Women Prisoners, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 85, 105-06
(1995) (arguing that an objective test of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
standard should be gender-specific); Pamela M. Rosenblatt, The Dilemma of Overcrowding
in the Nation’s Prisons, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 489, 497-500 (1991) (reviewing possible
traditional challenges to overcrowding); Jeffrey Welty, Restrictions on Prisoners’ Religious
Freedom as Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement, 48 DUKE L.J. 601, 602 (1998)
(arguing that restrictions on the exercise of religious practices should be analyzed under the
Eighth Amendment). But see Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right
Different from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 784 (1994) (arguing that strict
scrutiny should apply to criminal statutes that authorize incarceration for offenses); James
E. Robertson, The Majority Opinion as the Social Construction of Reality: The Supreme Court
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sentencing and proportionality, scholars have argued that certain
punishments should be considered unconstitutionally disproportion-
ate or that the Court’s proportionality analysis itself is flawed.20 And
some commentators have argued for particular ways in which
sentencing decisions could be informed by nontraditional consider-
ations, without changing the contours of proportionality review.21
But no Eighth Amendment commentators have focused on the
remedial gap discussed here.
Once one accepts that abusive treatment dispensed by state
correctional officials is punishment under the Eighth Amendment,22
and that there are limits to the amount of punishment that may be
inflicted by the State, there is no sound justification in doctrine or
theory for maintaining the gap. Providing the remedy of release
would make for a more coherent Eighth Amendment doctrine and
would also have the potential to achieve a level of deterrence from
constitutional violations that has not been achieved through com-
pensatory remedies. Although there are doctrinal and practical
objections to this proposal,23 they are insubstantial compared to the
cost of maintaining the doctrinal incoherence in current Eighth
Amendment analysis.
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I reviews
current Eighth Amendment doctrine and practice with respect to
remedies, establishing that courts provide a remedy of release in
those rare instances when the State has chosen to punish solely
through unconstitutional means. Part II discusses ways in which
providing release as a remedy would ease the significant internal
tension that currently exists in remedial Eighth Amendment
and Prison Rules, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 161, 193-95 (2000) (arguing for a principle of restorative
justice to inform sentencing decisions); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of
Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 840-43 (2006) (proposing greater scrutiny of the
prosecutors’ role in sentencing); Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised Felons
and the Constitutional No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 141-42 (2005) (considering
felon disenfranchisement through the proportionality lens).
20. See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, International Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth
Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 63, 72-74 (2007) (criticizing the Court’s reliance on inter-
national consensus as normative authority in proportionality analysis).
21. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 19, at 193-95; Stuntz, supra note 19, at 840-43. See
generally Colb, supra note 19, at 821-49.
22. As will be discussed below, although this proposition is well established as a matter
of doctrine, it is more controversial as a matter of punishment theory. See infra Part III.
23. See infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
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doctrine. Part III shows that the remedy of release is also consistent
with retributive and consequentialist principles of punishment
philosophy. Having shown that the remedy I propose is consistent
with doctrine and theory, Part IV addresses some practical consider-
ations that must be taken into account if the remedy is to be fully
enforced. There are some benefits and costs to this proposal, and
some difficult questions concerning the law of remedies that must
be engaged, but none of the objections suffices to reject out of hand
the remedy proposed here. And the benefits that it provides, both
practical and doctrinal, are substantial.
I. REVIEW OF CURRENT EIGHTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
As this Part will demonstrate, there are three different remedial
schemes for an Eighth Amendment violation, depending on both the
type of Eighth Amendment violation challenged and the timing of
the violation. When a prisoner challenges a sentence prior to its
imposition through proportionality analysis, the principal remedy
available is striking the sentence down.24 When a prisoner chal-
lenges conditions of confinement that are ongoing in nature, a court
has power to order the cessation of those conditions or, in extreme
cases, order the release of prisoners.25 But, when a prisoner chal-
lenges the infliction of harsh treatment that has occurred in the
past, whether that treatment is caused by an individual corrections
official or by a set of prison policies, customs, or practices, the pris-
oner may obtain only monetary damages.26 This Part reviews the
Eighth Amendment doctrine that leads to this remedial difference,
beginning with a discussion of sentencing jurisprudence and moving
to conditions of confinement case law.
A. Early Sentencing Jurisprudence
Defendants facing a sentence for a criminal offense, whether to a
term of years or to a sanction such as the death penalty,27 have a
24. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
27. For the most part, states currently punish either through incarceration and monetary
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limited ability to challenge the permissibility of such punishments.
As a constitutional matter, the Eighth Amendment is the primary
limitation on the power of the State to mete out sanctions.28 Of the
different aspects of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, sentencing
litigation in the federal courts is the most senior. For almost 200
years, indeed, the only kind of Eighth Amendment litigation
involved challenges to sentences, whether to terms of years of
imprisonment or to the mode of punishment.29 If seniority has its
advantages, however, it is not reflected in Eighth Amendment
litigation: of all the different kinds of Eighth Amendment chal-
lenges, challenges to sentences have generally been the least
successful, particularly with regard to noncapital sentences.30 A
fines, the threat of incarceration (such as probation), or execution. Other modes of
punishment, such as whipping, the ducking stool, and the like, have generally been
abandoned—in large part as a result of modern conceptions of the role of punishment and the
limits of the Eighth Amendment. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
28. The First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments also place some limitations on the
state’s power to punish. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005) (equal
protection); Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995) (procedural due process); O’Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352-53 (1987) (religious exercise); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 99-100 (1987) (speech rights). This Article does not address these limitations.
29. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878); Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 475, 479-80 (1866).
30. For all of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court held that the Amendment
applied only to national, not state, legislation, and thus the number of sentencing challenges
that were justiciable was minimal. See Pervear, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 479-80 (1866); see also
O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 332 (1892); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448-49 (1890). To
the extent that the federal courts decided Eighth Amendment cases, however, sentences were
rarely, if ever, found unconstitutional. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135 (1878) (noting that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit execution by shooting for first-degree murder); Pervear,
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 480 (“[I]t appears from the record that the fine and punishment in the
case before us was fifty dollars and imprisonment at hard labor in the house of correction for
three months. We perceive nothing excessive, or cruel, or unusual in this.”). Since the
beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has found sentences to be
unconstitutional in only a handful of noncapital cases. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,
2034 (2010); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958)
(plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381-82 (1910). The Court generally
has held that sentences of terms of years will almost never be unconstitutional. See Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11, 21, 30-31 (2003) (plurality opinion); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
77 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373-
74 (1982) (per curiam). In capital cases, the Court has recently been more receptive to
arguments from offenders—but only when there were specific characteristics of the defendant
that rendered the death penalty inappropriate. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 435-
38 (2008) (conviction of a crime that did not involve death); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
578-79 (2005) (age); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002) (mental retardation).
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brief review here is necessary to establish only a few key proposi-
tions.
First, early Eighth Amendment cases established that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited torture and its ilk31 but that judicial
deference to legislative judgments about the appropriateness of a
particular punishment was nearly insurmountable.32 The same was
true of most state courts that interpreted state constitutional
analogs33 to the Eighth Amendment.34 Thus, many state courts
upheld punishments that fell within a common understanding of
“cruel” or “unusual” or both but that did not meet the more specific
requirement of having been rejected at common law.35
Second, beginning with state courts adjudicating state constitu-
tional analogs to the Eighth Amendment36 but eventually moving to
federal courts, a weak constitutional prohibition on excessive pun-
ishments, even if administered in terms of years, has emerged.37
31. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136; see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447 (“Punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death.”). Cases in state courts from the
nineteenth century similarly limited state constitutional prohibitions of cruel and unusual
punishment to “barbarous” or “torturous” treatment. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 375-79
(reviewing state court judgments).
32. See Pervear, 72 U.S. at 480 (“The mode adopted, of prohibiting under penalties the sale
and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors, without license ... is wholly within the discretion
of State legislatures.”).
33. Many states had adopted the same language from Virginia’s Declaration of Rights,
sometimes prohibiting cruel or unusual punishment instead of cruel and unusual punishment.
See, e.g., WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14. Very few state courts placed much reliance on the use of the
disjunctive, at least in the nineteenth century. But see People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 877
(Mich. 1992) (relying on the disjunctive “or” in Michigan’s constitution to justify departure
from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment).
34. See Reinert, supra note 5, at 58 & n.20 (collecting cases).
35. See, e.g., People v. Kemmler, 24 N.E. 9, 11 (N.Y. 1890) (rejecting a challenge under a
state constitution to death penalty by electrocution).
36. See, e.g., Cardillo v. People, 58 P. 678, 680-81 (Colo. 1899) (holding that a penalty must
be “clearly excessive” to violate constitution); Harper v. Commonwealth, 19 S.W. 737, 738 (Ky.
1892) (noting that a court can only find a punishment cruel and unusual when “it clearly
manifestly so appears” and punishing gambling with imprisonment does not offend this
principle); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (Mass. 1899) (conceding the
“possib[ility] that imprisonment in the state prison for a long term of years might be so
disproportionate to the offense as to constitute a cruel and unusual punishment”); State v.
Becker, 51 N.W. 1018, 1022 (S.D. 1892) (stating that “great latitude” must be given to the
legislature, and courts should intervene “only when the punishment is so excessive or so cruel
as to meet the disapproval and condemnation of the conscience and reason of men generally”).
37. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997-1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (articulating a “narrow” proportionality principle).
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Before the Supreme Court ever found a sentence excessive as a
matter of federal constitutional law, a surprising number of state
courts struck down sentences, expressed both as modes of punish-
ment and terms of years in prison, for being excessive. In some of
these cases, the punishment at issue was akin to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.38 In other cases, however, the term
of imprisonment was much less.39 And the modes of punishment
courts found unconstitutional ranged from lashes and the ducking
stool to seizure of property.40 
B. Modern Sentencing Jurisprudence
To a large extent, this dual understanding of the Eighth
Amendment—that it prohibits both punishments inconsistent with
prevailing standards of decency and excessive punishments—
persists to this day. Courts recognize that sentences may be judged
38. See State v. Ross, 104 P. 596, 604-05 (Or. 1909) (holding that life imprisonment for
nonpayment of a fine arising from a larceny conviction is cruel and unusual punishment and
that a court may declare the sentence excessive “even though within the maximum of the
statute”); cf. Jones v. Territory, 43 P. 1072, 1074 (Okla. 1896) (suggesting in dicta that the
sentence of fifty years for manslaughter might be “cruel and inhuman” if it exceeded “the
probable lifetime of the person convicted”).
39. See State ex rel. Garvey v. Whitaker, 19 So. 457, 457, 459 (La. 1896) (holding that
imprisonment for 2160 days for being in default of paying fines of $720 violated the state
constitution when the trial court imposed a sentence for seventy-two distinct offenses of one
city ordinance); State v. Driver, 78 N.C. 423, 429 (1878) (holding a sentence of five years
imprisonment for assault and battery of defendant’s wife to be unconstitutional under state
law, and noting that the power to find a sentence unconstitutional “is there, not so much to
draw a fine line close up to which the judges may come, but as a ‘warning’ to keep them clear
away from it”); see also Byrnes v. People, 37 Mich. 515, 517 (1877) (holding that five years
sentence for petit larceny was excessive); Johnson v. Waukesha County, 25 N.W. 7, 9 (Wis.
1885) (suggesting in dicta that an antitramp law could be unconstitutional because it made
tramping a felony simply by virtue of the location of the crime and because the punishment
amounted to fifteen days in jail with a diet of bread and water alone).
40. See Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385, 438-39 (1863) (holding that a statute
providing for seizure of property and slaves of persons engaging in rebellion during the Civil
War was unconstitutional); Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh) 70, 74 (1820) (finding a
sentence of thirty lashes unconstitutional when applied as a punishment to a “free person of
color” who attempted to defend himself against assault by a white person); James v.
Commonwealth, 2 Serg. & Rawle 220, 230, 1825 WL 1899, at *13-14 (Pa. 1825) (holding that
the ducking stool was unconstitutional for punishment of “common scold”); cf. Thomas v.
Kinkead, 18 S.W. 854, 856 (Ark. 1892) (holding that police officer may not use deadly force to
effectuate arrest of a misdemeanant because it would be unconstitutional to punish a
misdemeanor with the death penalty).
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under two different standards: one that focuses on the need for a
sentence to comport with historical and modern understandings of
the limits on the State’s power to infringe on the offender’s dignity
and a second that more narrowly asks whether a particular pun-
ishment is excessive in relation to a particular offense. Although the
first approach was incorporated into the earliest federal decisions
concerning the Eighth Amendment, the United States Supreme
Court did not embrace the second excessiveness approach until its
1910 decision in Weems v. United States, the first time it struck
down a sentence under the Punishment Clause.41
In Weems, the Court reviewed a sentence imposed by a court
pursuant to a Philippines statute that prohibited falsifying a public
document.42 The trial court had sentenced the defendant, a Coast
Guard official, to fifteen years imprisonment, as well as to an
additional punishment known as cadena temporal.43 Individuals
sentenced to cadena temporal were required, pursuant to statute, to
engage in “hard labor,”44 were chained at the ankle and wrist at all
times, and were deprived of certain rights and privileges even after
release from prison.45 Because the Court viewed the sentence as
excessive, especially compared to sentences for more serious crimes,
it did not display its typical deference to the legislature’s exercise of
its prerogative to set an appropriate punishment.46
41. 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910).
42. Id. at 381-82. Because the case arose out of the Philippines, which contained a cruel
and unusual punishment clause identical to the Eighth Amendment, the issue of
incorporation of the Eighth Amendment against the states did not arise.
43. Id. at 362-64. The punishment originated in Spain and literally means “temporary
chain.” See id. at 363.
44. The requirement that prisoners engage in hard labor originated in England in the
mid-1500s and came into vogue in the United States at the beginning of the eighteenth
century on the theory that work was intimately connected to successful rehabilitation. See
David McCord, Imagining a Retributivist Alternative to Capital Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV.
1, 83-85 (1998). The United States also had overlapping economic interests in putting convicts
to work, particularly as a substitute for slave labor after the Civil War. See Alexis M. Durham
III, Lease System, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 277-79 (Marilyn D. McShane &
Frank P. Williams eds., 1996).
45. Weems, 217 U.S. at 364-66. The additional punishment associated with cadena
temporal included deprivation of parental rights, the right to dispose of property through a
will, the obligation to give authorities notice of any change in domicile, and disqualification
to hold public office or to vote. Id. at 364-65. As the Supreme Court noted, the only
punishments more severe than cadena temporal were death or cadena perpetual. Id. at 364.
46. Id. at 380-81 (comparing punishment to punishments for crimes such as homicide,
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After Weems, the Supreme Court added little to Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence for some years, failing to address a
substantive Eighth Amendment claim until 1958, almost fifty years
later. In Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court again struck down a
punishment as “cruel and unusual,” but this time the Court pro-
vided neither a controlling opinion nor agreement as to how best to
operationalize the Eighth Amendment in challenges to particular
sentences.47 The statute invalidated in Trop authorized federal
courts to impose denationalization as a punishment for military
desertion, a penalty that the Court found to be repugnant to Eighth
Amendment principles and international law.48 The plurality in
Trop, however, shied away from the excessiveness analysis intro-
duced in Weems and instead focused more on the consistency of
denationalization with the plurality’s conception of a just punish-
ment.49
Instead of reviewing the sentence for disproportionality, the Trop
plurality asked whether the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee of
“civilized treatment” prohibited the penalty.50 In so doing, the
Justices made clear that the constitutional permissibility of the
death penalty did not permit the State to implement “any punish-
ment short of death” but that “evolving standards of decency” were
independent restrictions on the government’s power to punish.51 The
plurality identified within the Eighth Amendment a basic concept
of protecting dignity52 and reasoned that traditional methods of
punishment—fines, incarceration, and execution—were constitu-
tionally permissible. Punishment that fell outside these borders
would be reviewed with suspicion.53
conspiracy, and forgery).
47. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
48. Id. at 101 (plurality opinion).
49. The four-Justice plurality in Trop viewed disproportionality as an invalid basis for
finding denationalization unconstitutional for the crime of desertion during war because death
was a constitutional punishment for the same crime. Id. at 99. It may also have been difficult
for the plurality to embrace a principle of proportionality when the sentence was not subject
to degrees, such as a term of years.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 99-101.
52. Id. at 100.
53. Id. (“[A]ny technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is
constitutionally suspect.”). On the plurality’s reasoning, denationalization was incompatible
with basic standards of dignity because it deprived the individual of the “right to have rights.”
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After Trop, sentencing jurisprudence has become elusive, with a
mix of plurality and majority decisions of the Court providing little
guidance.54 In cases involving sentences of terms of years, for
instance, the Court has hinted—but no majority has explicitly
held—that sentences of discrete terms of years will almost never be
struck down as being unconstitutional, whether the excessiveness
or evolving-standards-of-decency analysis is used.55 The only ex-
ceptions appear to be those rare instances in which the Court has
struck down life sentences, usually without the possibility of
parole,56 or when the Court has referred to hypothetical punish-
ments that it assumed would be disproportionate, such as incarcera-
tion for having a cold or life imprisonment for overtime parking.57 In
all of these circumstances, whether upholding or striking down a
sentence of terms of years, the Court has generally relied on some
form of proportionality or excessiveness analysis.58
Id. at 101-02.
54. Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-90 (1983) (describing Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) as an example of a case in which a proportionality principle is
recognized), Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-801 (1982) (recognizing proportionality
principle), Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (same), Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977) (same), Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (same), and Trop, 356 U.S.
at 100 (same), with Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 273 (1980) (stating that Weems’
proportionality analysis “cannot be wrenched from the extreme facts of that case”).
55. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372-73 (1982) (per curiam) (rejecting an Eighth
Amendment challenge to a prison term of forty years and a fine of $20,000 for possession and
distribution of approximately nine ounces of marijuana).
56. Solem, 463 U.S. at 296-300, 303 (setting aside a sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole, imposed under a South Dakota recidivist statute).
57. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11 (“This is not to say that a proportionality principle
would not come into play in the extreme example mentioned by the dissent, ... if a legislature
made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.”). In Hutto, the content of
Rummel’s footnote was arguably expanded: Rummel’s “not [saying] that a proportionality
principle would not come into play” in the fanciful parking example, id., became “not[ing] ...
that there could be situations in which the proportionality principle would come into play,
such as” the fanciful parking example. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374 n.3 (emphasis added). In Atkins,
the Court cited to Robinson for the proposition that even one day in jail as punishment for
having the common cold would be deemed excessive and unconstitutional. Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (citing Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667).
58. In Solem, the Court’s decision to strike down a life sentence without parole was based
on the proportionality principle. 463 U.S. at 296-300, 303. In Harmelin, the Court upheld a
sentence of life without parole for a first-time offender convicted of possessing 672 grams of
cocaine, again based on the proportionality principle. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
961, 994-95 (1991). Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote separately in Harmelin
to argue that the proportionality principle applied only to death penalty cases, not to term-of-
2012] RELEASE AS REMEDY FOR EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT 1591
On the other hand, in death penalty cases, the Court has gen-
erally adhered to Trop’s evolving-standards-of-decency framework
to find, in certain instances, that the death penalty is unconstitu-
tional because of the particular characteristics of the condemned
defendant—his age, mental status, and the like.59 A sentence of
death is treated differently in this context because of the risk that
the State will cross the constitutional line that distinguishes re-
straint from cruelty and vengeance.60 There has been some disagree-
ment in these cases as to whether there is any proper role for courts
to determine, in their own judgment, whether a particular sentence
is proportionate punishment for a particular offender or particular
set of offenders.61
Despite the formal distinction in analysis between challenges to
imprisonment and challenges to the death sentence, the Court has
suggested at times that the inquiry into what punishments are
considered “excessive” is coterminous with the inquiry into whether
years sentences. Id. at 994 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,
31-32 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (objecting that the proportionality principle is
fundamentally a policy judgment, not a legal one). In Ewing, the plurality and dissenters
applied the proportionality review from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin. Id. at 22-
24 (plurality opinion); id. at 32-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[B]y broadly prohibiting excessive
sanctions, the Eighth Amendment directs judges to exercise their wise judgment in assessing
the proportionality of all forms of punishment.”); id. at 35-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (applying
Justice Kennedy’s proportionality analysis).
59. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-64, 574-75 (2005) (finding that the execution
of defendants who committed a capital crime while younger than eighteen years old was
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (holding that the death
penalty for the mentally retarded is “excessive” because it is inconsistent with evolving
standards of decency); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818-38 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that “civilized standards of decency” prohibit the execution of any offender under
the age of sixteen at the time of the crime); see also id. at 855, 858-59 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (agreeing that constitutionality of the death penalty is generally measured by
conformance with societal standards of decency but finding narrower grounds to hold sentence
unconstitutional); id. at 873 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing that appropriate standard is
“evolving standards of decency”).
60. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (expressing concern that imposition
of the death penalty may “descen[d] into brutality, transgressing the constitutional
commitment to decency and restraint”).
61. Compare, e.g., Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835-38 (plurality opinion) (endorsing a
proportionality analysis based on extent to which the death penalty accomplished deterrent
and retributive goals for offenders who were under the age of sixteen), with Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377-83 (1989) (plurality opinion) (rejecting suggestion that the Court
should use its own judgment to determine the constitutionality of the death penalty),
overruled in part by Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
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society’s “evolving standards of decency” prohibit it.62 In so doing,
the Court has clearly linked concepts of proportionality with the
Eighth Amendment’s guarantee of dignity to the offender.63 Thus,
the Eighth Amendment is said to prohibit excessive punishments,
as well as “cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be
excessive.”64 The implication is that all disproportionate punish-
ments violate evolving standards of decency, but some punishments
that violate evolving standards of decency may not necessarily also
be disproportionate.
The Court explicitly recognized this connection in its most recent
case involving a challenge to the imposition on juvenile offenders of
a life sentence without the possibility of parole. The Court applied
both proportionality analysis and a dignity-based framework for
striking down the sentence.65 The former requires courts to look at
the particular characteristics of a defendant and his offense,
whereas the latter asks whether a particular kind of punishment is
prohibited under all circumstances.66 Thus, both the “evolving-
standards-of-decency” rubric from Trop and the more general pro-
portionality analysis from Weems are extant in current challenges
to sentencing decisions.67
62. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-64 (finding the execution of defendants who committed
capital crime while younger than eighteen years old to be unconstitutional); see also Kennedy,
554 U.S. at 435-38 (finding the death penalty to be disproportionate punishment for child
rape); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (finding the death penalty to be unconstitutional when applied
to mentally retarded defendants).
63. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560; see also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 (“Evolving standards of
decency must embrace and express respect for the dignity of the person, and the punishment
of criminals must conform to that rule.”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (recognizing that the question in Eighth Amendment cases is whether punishment
is “inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; ... [or] dispro-
portionate to the crime for which it is imposed”); cf. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 992 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (recognizing that Weems contained language that can represent either principle
but criticizing proportionality interpretation).
64. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 n.7; see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
65. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021-23 (2010).
66. See id. The Court in Graham subdivided proportionality litigation even further,
separating cases in which the sentence is noncapital and cases in which the Court has drawn
categorical lines in capital cases. See id. at 2022.
67. Exactly how to determine when a sentence is disproportionate and when treatment
violates evolving standards of decency is beyond the scope of this Article, but as a general
matter, the Supreme Court has defined the former with more analytical rigor than the latter.
See Reinert, supra note 5, at 67-68.
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C. Remedies for Sentencing Challenges
A review of the doctrine until now tells us only how to decide
whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment—not what to
do after we come to that conclusion. To complete this part of the
story, we start once again with Weems because, as noteworthy as it
is for the doctrine of proportionality that it embraced, it also offers
a clue as to the proper remedy in sentencing challenges. Over the
vigorous dissent of Justices White and Holmes, the Weems majority
dismissed the charges against the offender entirely, concluding that
the legislation mandated an unlawful sentence and no other source
of law provided for an alternative sentence.68 As the dissent pointed
out, the Court could have separated the legal from illegal portions
of the punishment and permitted the imposition of a sentence of a
term of years without the accessories that accompanied the cadena
temporal,69 but the majority did not leave this option open to the
Philippines upon remand.70 Thus, under Weems, when the only
sentence that could be imposed pursuant to statute was an uncon-
stitutional one, the only appropriate remedy was no punishment at
all.71
In most subsequent cases in which the Court found a penalty
unconstitutional, there was an alternative sentence that could have
been imposed without violating the Constitution, or the Court re-
manded to permit the lower or state court to impose a new sentence
that did not violate the Eighth Amendment.72 In some cases, there
was no need to address the remedial difficulty presented in Weems.73
68. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (“[T]he fault is in the law; and, as
we are pointed to no other under which a sentence can be imposed, the judgment must be
reversed, with directions to dismiss the proceedings.”). The Court declined to consider the
fixed imprisonment term of the sentence separately from the conditions of confinement
imposed by the cadena temporal sentence because they had been imposed pursuant to statute
and, therefore, had to be considered jointly as punishment. Id. at 381.
69. Id. at 412-13 (White, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 382 (majority opinion). 
71. It would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause for the legislature to enact a new statute to
retroactively impose a punishment that does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Garner v.
Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 249 (2000).
72. See Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 1982) (remanding with directions to
issue writ of habeas corpus if offenders could not be resentenced), aff’d, 463 U.S. 277, 303
(1983).
73. Take Trop, for instance. Albert Trop, the deserter, had already served his prison
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But the Weems decision reinforced the notion that it is better for the
government not to impose punishment at all than to impose an
unconstitutional punishment.
In summary, three conclusions can be gleaned from this review
of sentencing jurisprudence. First, as a substantive matter, sen-
tences that are either disproportionate to the offense or inconsistent
with evolving standards of decency are considered unconstitutional.
Relatedly, punishment that is corporal in some sense—the imposi-
tion of death or barbarous treatment, such as whipping—is more
vulnerable to constitutional challenge than punishment of impris-
onment for a term of years. Finally, if the State is willing to impose
only an unconstitutional punishment on the offender, then the
Eighth Amendment requires that no punishment at all be meted
out.74
sentence and had been dishonorably discharged from the Army. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
87-88 (1958) (plurality opinion). The penalty of denationalization had been imposed under a
separate statute. Id. Thus, the Court did not have to determine whether any alternatives to
punishment existed under which Trop could be properly sentenced. It directed the district
court to conduct “appropriate proceedings” in light of its opinion, which presumably were
limited to declaring that Trop remained a citizen of the United States. Id. at 104.
74. The preference that offenders remain free rather than subjected to inhumane
treatment is not limited to sentencing challenges. The Supreme Court and many state courts
have implicitly accepted the preference that prisoners be free rather than face inhumane
conditions of confinement by recognizing a limited defense of necessity or duress in cases in
which prisoners seek to escape from intolerable prison conditions. See United States v. Bailey,
444 U.S. 394, 409-17 (1980). Under this jurisprudence, courts have approved of necessity
instructions when threats of death or physical harm from prison officials were alleged, when
threats from other prisoners were made, and when the escapee feared being sexually abused.
See United States v. Lopez, 885 F.2d 1428, 1431-34 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds
by Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989); People v. Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110,
116 (Ct. App. 1974) (vacating defendant's conviction for escaping from confinement and
recognizing that “some conditions excuseth the felony” (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also People v. Trujillo, 586 P.2d 235, 237-38 (Colo. App. 1978) (granting prisoner an
opportunity to claim that his escape was motivated by duress); People v. Unger, 362 N.E.2d
319, 323-24 (Ill. 1977) (allowing a necessity defense for a prison inmate who escaped after
receiving alleged threats from other inmates); Randolph v. State, 996 A.2d 907, 926-27 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (limiting the defense to particularly dangerous circumstances); People
v. Harmon, 220 N.W.2d 212, 213 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (allowing an escapee to claim a defense
of duress because of his fear of prison rape); Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse,
Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 35-36 (2003) (noting that a prisoner who escapes under
true necessity has not violated any “substantive norm of the criminal law regime,” even
though there is concern that prisoners who learn of exculpation will be more likely to attempt
to escape in situations not constituting true necessity); Marc O. DeGirolami, Culpability in
Creating the Choice of Evils, 60 ALA. L. REV. 597, 647 n.38 (2009) (describing an escape from
a burning prison as a situation commonly thought to be a necessity). Granted, these cases only
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D. Conditions of Confinement Litigation
Conditions of confinement jurisprudence is closely related to
sentencing litigation, in that it also generally rests on basic
premises of human dignity. Indeed, Weems and Trop provided the
frame for Estelle v. Gamble, the first modern case to conceptualize
prison conditions alone, separate and apart from a criminal sen-
tence, as punishment under the Eighth Amendment.75 Like the sen-
tencing cases resolving challenges to capital punishment, Estelle
looked to both Weems and Trop to establish that the Eighth
Amendment applies not only to corporal punishments but also to
treatment incompatible with evolving standards of decency or
involving the unnecessary imposition of pain.76 With these stan-
dards in mind, the Estelle Court held that the government had some
obligation to provide medical care to prisoners, because the absence
of such care could cause suffering with no penological purpose.77
Such deprivations of medical care that amounted to deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs were equivalent, in the Court’s
view, to unnecessary infliction of pain.78
Estelle is also significant for a discussion that is further analyzed
later in this Article—it explicitly held that conditions of confinement
imposed by prison officials, rather than by statute, can constitute
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.79 In Estelle, the Court
prohibit the imposition of additional punishment for escape when prisoners face inhumane
conditions of confinement. But they also imply that if every prison exposed the offender to
these conditions, continued confinement would be impermissible.
75. 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
76. Id. at 102-03; see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737-38 (2002) (linking the Eighth
Amendment to dignity and finding that an Eighth Amendment violation was obvious because
there was no safety justification for discipline that exposed the prisoner to risk of physical
harm); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (noting that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits disproportionate punishments and those that are inconsistent with contemporary
standards of decency).
77. 429 U.S. at 103.
78. Id. at 104. The deliberate indifference standard is the subject of much Eighth
Amendment litigation, but it essentially is akin to criminal recklessness. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1994) (adopting a subjective recklessness standard as used
in criminal law as the test for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment).
79. 429 U.S. at 104-05. It did so with little substantive analysis—an aspect of Estelle that
has been criticized by Justices Scalia and Thomas, who argue that conditions of confinement
imposed by prison officials should never be considered punishment for Eighth Amendment
purposes. E.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40-42 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting). In so
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recognized that early Eighth Amendment cases focused on whether
punishments involved torture or other repulsive modes of punish-
ment.80 But Estelle turned to Weems, death penalty jurisprudence,
and Trop to acknowledge that concepts of human dignity and
civilized standards of decency had expanded the categories of
punishment deemed prohibited by the Punishment Clause.81
Estelle’s deliberate indifference standard was informed in no small
part by an earlier case, Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, in
which Justice Reed’s plurality opinion held that a second attempt to
electrocute a condemned prisoner did not violate the Eighth
Amendment when the pain caused by the first unsuccessful attempt
was an accident.82 As such, although the prisoner had suffered un-
necessary pain, it was not the result of a culpable state of mind so
as to be considered “cruel.”83 Thus, treatment that resulted in
gratuitous imposition of pain could be considered prohibited pun-
ishment only so long as the prison official imposing the treatment
possessed the requisite state of mind.84
The basic principles of Estelle—that certain conditions of con-
finement, when imposed with specified states of mind, can con-
stitute punishment that goes beyond that permitted by the Eighth
Amendment—has been extended in many directions. The Supreme
Court has held that atmospheric conditions of confinement—
overcrowding, lack of sanitation, lack of adequate nutrition—may
rise to unconstitutional punishment when they deprive offenders of
doing, however, these dissenters have described Weems as a case about a “sentence imposed
for the crime of falsifying a document,” without adverting to the aspect of Weems that
addressed the conditions of confinement imposed under cadena temporal. Id. at 41 n.1.
Notably, pre-Estelle state and federal court cases that had addressed challenges to conditions
of confinement had assumed that barbaric conditions could constitute punishment without
much analysis, perhaps because they were brought as habeas actions rather than claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since Estelle, the Court has noted that the Eighth Amendment
applies to all those “entrusted with the criminal-law function of government.” Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (noting that the Eighth
Amendment places restraints and imposes duties on prison officials, who must provide
humane conditions of confinement to prisoners); Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685 (noting that
confinement in an isolation cell is punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
80. 429 U.S. at 102.
81. Id. at 102-03.
82. 329 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1947) (plurality opinion).
83. Id. at 464.
84. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-05.
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basic human needs.85 And the use of force by corrections offi-
cials—whether during widespread prison unrest or in response to
isolated misconduct by prisoners—may constitute excessive pun-
ishment when the force is applied to cause harm and not to restore
order or for some other legitimate penological purpose.86 Overlaying
all of these extensions is the Court’s recognition that when prison
officials fail to protect offenders from the risk of serious harm—be
it occasioned by other offenders, correction officers, medical per-
sonnel, or the atmospheric conditions of confinement at issue in
Rhodes v. Chapman87—they can be held liable under the Eighth
Amendment, so long as the officials possess the required culpable
state of mind.88
There are several assumptions at work in the Court’s conditions
of confinement precedent that are relevant to this Article’s project.
First, as noted above, the Court has made it clear that conditions of
confinement, whether imposed by statute, system- or facility-wide
prison policies, or individual state officials, are considered punish-
ment.89 And when this punishment exceeds the bounds of decency,
the Eighth Amendment rights of the offender are violated.90 Harsh
conditions of confinement may constitute cruel and unusual
85. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-48 (1981).
86. E.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1992) (noting that the core judicial inquiry
when evaluating an accusation of excessive punishment is whether the force was applied in
good-faith effort to maintain order, or maliciously to cause harm); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 319 (1986) (“It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that
characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”).
87. 452 U.S. at 340.
88. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994). More recent cases acknowledge
that imposing a risk of future harm, even if unaccompanied by actual pain, can in certain
circumstances cross the line for Eighth Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney,
509 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993). Thus, in rejecting a challenge to a lethal injection procedure, a
plurality of the Court noted that to establish a claim, a condemned prisoner must show that
there is an alternative procedure for causing death that is “feasible, readily implemented, and
[will] in fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35,
52 (2008) (plurality opinion).
89. Helling, 509 U.S. at 32-33, 36 (holding that conditions of confinement that pose a risk
of future harm can violate the Eighth Amendment); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345 (stating that
confinement is a form of punishment); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (noting that
confinement in an isolation cell is punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment).
90. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976).
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punishment unless such conditions “are part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”91
Second, the Court has implied that certain conditions of confine-
ment may not be imposed on offenders no matter how serious their
crimes. For example, as the Court recognized in Farmer v. Brennan,
being attacked in prison is not an implied part of the sanctions
authorized by criminal statutes.92 Thus, the Court has made a
distinction between “proper” punishment on one hand and abusive
punishment on the other.93
Third, in developing its concept of what constitutes abusive and
unconstitutional punishment, the Court has focused on objective
criteria, not the subjective experience of prisoners. Objectively, the
prisoner must show that the conditions of confinement that he has
experienced constitute an “extreme” deprivation of life’s basic neces-
sities, including adequate medical care, food, shelter, or safety.94
Even maliciously imposed intentional uses of force, if they are
objectively de minimis, do not amount to violations of the Eighth
Amendment.95 At the same time, force that causes little injury may
still be unconstitutional if it is more than de minimis.96 The Court
explicitly links excessive force standards to the contemporary stan-
dards-of-decency rubric precisely because the Eighth Amendment
focuses on the objective amount of force used, not the subjective
injury suffered by a prisoner.97
Fourth, the State can work unconstitutional punishment through
the acts of private individuals such as other prisoners, at least when
state actors contribute to the violent acts of such offenders.98 In this
91. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
92. 511 U.S. at 834 (“Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty
that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
93. In Hudson v. McMillian, the Court maintained that it requires serious deprivations
in conditions of confinement cases because “routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992) (citing
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). By contrast, whenever force is used maliciously or sadistically, it
violates contemporary standards of decency because there is never justification for using force
with those goals. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 9-10.
96. Id.
97. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1177-78 (2010) (per curiam).
98. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974) (cited with approval in Rhodes,
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context, courts generally have no difficulty conceptualizing the
state-facilitated violence of one prisoner upon another as punish-
ment and recognizing that prison officials have an obligation “to
insure that inmates are not subjected to any punishment beyond
that which is necessary for the orderly administration” of the
prison.99
Fifth, and relatedly, for conditions or treatment to count as
punishment, they must be administered with a required state of
mind.100 The subjective state of mind that must be established de-
pends on the context and ranges from deliberate indifference, which
is something akin to criminal recklessness, to intentionality.101 This
is because the Court determined that punishment presumes some
act intended to meet one of the disparate purposes of punishment.102
In so doing, the Court has rejected alternative proposals at both
extremes: it has declined to adopt a prisoner-protective standard
and hold that all prison conditions, without regard to officials’
actual or constructive knowledge of them, constitute punishment for
purposes of the Constitution,103 and it has rejected the minimalist
argument that prison conditions, other than those imposed pursu-
ant to statute or by a sentencing judge, never constitute punishment
under the Punishment Clause.104 The Court also has dispelled the
contention that there is any significant distinction between discrete
452 U.S. 337) (noting that the Eighth Amendment is violated whether perpetrators of violence
are inmates themselves or high-level prison officials, at least when prison officials facilitate
the use of violence by other prisoners).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (“The source of the intent requirement is
not the predilections of this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel
and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the
statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting
officer before it can qualify.”).
101. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842-43 (1994) (requiring that the plaintiff show
deliberate indifference when alleging that prison officials failed to protect a prisoner from
assault by other detainees); Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (holding that excessive force is actionable
under the Eighth Amendment if the official used force “maliciously and sadistically” to cause
harm and not for a legitimate penological reason).
102. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300-01.
103. Id. at 301 n.2.
104. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (concluding that deliberate indif-
ference to a prisoner’s medical needs can violate the Eighth Amendment).
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instances of abuse, like deprivation of medical care, and more
systemic deprivations, such as those at stake in Rhodes.105
As for remedies available for unconstitutional conditions of con-
finement, judges have exercised the extraordinary power to order
release only when there was a threat of ongoing violations.106 This
power was comprehended, at least theoretically, by some lower
federal courts in the late 1940s that applied Weems to hold that
prisoners should be set free rather than returned to experience
further cruel and unusual punishment in Georgia’s prison system.107
Other courts hesitated to find otherwise “inexcusable and shocking”
conditions of confinement to violate the Eighth Amendment pre-
cisely because of the concern that the ramification of doing so would
result in the release of all prisoners held within the confines of the
particular institution.108 Thus, after Weems, lower courts accepted
that there was judicial power to order release as a remedy for future
Eighth Amendment violations likely to be experienced by a particu-
105. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300, 302-03.
106. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011) (upholding lower court’s order
requiring the release of prisoners to remedy overcrowding in California’s state prisons);
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 586 (10th Cir. 1980) (cited with approval in Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)) (acknowledging the district court’s power to order the closure
of a prison but remanding for district court to consider the scope of the remedy based on
progress made by Colorado on appeal).
107. See Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 253, 256 (3d Cir. 1949) (ordering that prisoner be
released because evidence indicated that Georgia prison officials “treat chain gang prisoners
with persistent and deliberate brutality” and that “the State of Georgia has failed signally in
its duty as one of the sovereign States of the United States to treat a convict with decency and
humanity”); Harper v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783, 787 (D.N.J. 1949) (following Johnson in a case
involving a fifteen-year-old escapee from Georgia who had been sentenced to ten years of
imprisonment). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded Johnson, not on the merits but
because the lower court had not required that the petitioner first exhaust his state law
remedies prior to filing his federal habeas petition. Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864, 864 (1949)
(reversing in light of Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944)). The Supreme Court, although not
passing on the question whether release on a habeas petition was a proper remedy for
experiencing cruel and unusual punishment, eventually made clear that state law remedies
must be pursued in the state in which the sentence was carried out, and not in the asylum
state. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 89-90 (1952).
108. E.g., Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285, 289-90 (D. Alaska 1951); see also Ex parte
Ellis, 91 P. 81, 83 (Kan. 1907) (“It must be obvious, however, that we cannot order the
petitioner released on account of the condition of the jail. To do so would require us on similar
applications to order the release of all prisoners confined there.”); cf. Ex parte Terrill, 287 P.
753, 755 (Okla. Crim. App. 1930) (declining to entertain a habeas petition alleging that
conditions amounted to cruel and unusual punishment when prisoner had not first attempted
to pursue state law remedies).
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lar prisoner. Of course, as in other areas of constitutional liti-
gation,109 courts may not order broad equitable remedies, such as
release, without first giving prison officials ample leeway to correct
violations.110
Courts became more open to exercising the power to release
offenders for ongoing Eighth Amendment violations in the 1970s
and 1980s, when prison reform litigation was at its peak.111 Even so,
such orders were rare because of the extreme nature of the remedy.
And after passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in
1996,112 statutory restrictions were placed on courts’ power to enter
prisoner release orders.113 But these limitations are not insuperable,
as the Supreme Court recently held in Brown v. Plata.114 Indeed, the
Supreme Court found that the remedy of release was appropriate in
Plata even though many of the prisoners benefiting from the release
were not contemporaneously experiencing harm caused by prison
overcrowding.115
As for past violations that have ceased prior to litigation, the only
remedy available to injured parties is damages, even when the past
violations were the result of the policy, custom, or widespread prac-
tices in a particular facility or correctional system.116 This proposi-
tion is so well understood that courts are loath to question its
rationale, either because it appears foreclosed by basic remedial
doctrine, as discussed below,117 or because of the historic delinkage
109. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977) (noting that school authorities
have the primary responsibility for managing and solving their obligations).
110. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 & n.9 (1978) (noting that the power of a district
court to order an equitable remedy is broad—but must take into account the opportunities
prison officials have to correct violations).
111. See Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 332-33 & n.
22 (2009).
112. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (1996) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (2006).
114. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1932-44 (2011) (finding that lower court’s release order satisfied
PLRA’s requirements).
115. Id. at 1940.
116. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (reaffirming that a party
having “actually suffered” from public officials’ unlawful conduct, without a showing of
ongoing injury, cannot satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement in order to seek
injunctive relief). 
117. See infra Part IV.A.
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between proportionality jurisprudence and conditions of confine-
ment law.118
II. REMEDIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT EIGHTH AMENDMENT
DOCTRINE
Having reviewed the substantive and remedial differences be-
tween proportionality and conditions of confinement litigation, I will
now turn to making the ramifications of these differences concrete.
Take the following hypothetical: imagine a legislature that passes
a criminal statute that, along with announcing terms of imprison-
ment, also imposes, as a condition of confinement, that one in five
prisoners will be randomly selected on a yearly basis to be victims
of a sexual assault.119 Concededly, it is difficult to imagine such a
statute being passed.120 However, if it were, it is also difficult to
imagine this sentence actually being imposed on convicted offend-
ers. It would surely be struck down for imposing cruel and unusual
punishment, in part, because it is at least disproportionate.121
118. I have discussed this delinkage at length in earlier work. See Reinert, supra note 5,
at 69-71.
119. It is estimated that 20 percent of prisoners serving life sentences will be sexually
assaulted in prison. See Nilsen, supra note 6, at 125-26. The sexual assault rates are difficult
to quantify, in part because of low self-reporting among some prisoners. See Pat Kaufman,
Prison Rape: Research Explores Prevalence, Prevention, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J., Mar. 2008, at
24, 24, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/221500.pdf. With sexual assault comes,
of course, trauma and the risk of sexually transmitted diseases. See Nilsen, supra note 6, at
126. Moreover, even those who are not assaulted experience fear and anxiety from the
prospect of assault. Id. at 123 & n.47. Congress has responded to the reality of sexual assault
in prison by passage of the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003. 42 U.S.C. § 15601 (2006).
This Act provides for information gathering more than anything else. See id. §§ 15603-15604.
120. See Reinert, supra note 5, at 83-84.
121. The example listed in the hypothetical statute is just a sampling of the harms caused
by prison conditions that are unfortunately prevalent in many states. For instance,
overcrowding has serious consequences that go beyond the effects of spatial limitations to
impact medical and programming availability. Craig Haney, The Wages of Prison
Overcrowding: Harmful Psychological Consequences and Dysfunctional Correctional
Reactions, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 265, 266-67 (2006). It can make it difficult or impossible
to screen or treat mentally ill prisoners. Id. at 273. It leads to increased idleness because of
the lack of prison jobs, which itself has harmful psychological and behavioral consequences.
Id. at 274-75 (noting that almost 40 percent of the national prison population has no work
assignment). Significant amounts of idle time can contribute to increased incidence of prison
rape. Id. at 275-76. There is also evidence of an increased risk of death by suicide or violence
linked to high prison populations and overcrowding. See Terence P. Thornberry & Jack E.
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Similarly, if a court was presented with a conditions of confinement
challenge in which advocates for prisoners could show that, as a re-
sult of overcrowding conditions, a prisoner is subject to a 20 percent
annual risk of rape, there is ample authority for a court to order a
prison system to relieve the overcrowding or be compelled to release
prisoners.122
But that leaves open the question of remedy for a prisoner who
already has been subjected to rape, whether by order of a statute or
as a result of unconstitutional conduct by a state actor. Currently,
the only remedy available to such a prisoner is damages.123 If state-
created conditions, whether imposed systemically or in discrete
instances of abuse, are “punishment,”124 then we should be willing
to entertain the thought that some discrete forms of punishment are
so horrific that they exhaust the State’s authority or capacity to
punish. This is particularly true when the abuse is the result of
systematic customs, policies, or practices. From this view, when a
prisoner experiences extreme suffering through state-imposed abuse
or conditions of confinement, the remedy should be no different than
if the State had attempted to impose the punishment ex ante. The
punishment should be declared disproportionate to the crime com-
mitted by the prisoner, and release or a reduction in sentence by
some defined term should be a potential remedy.
The flaws of the current remedial approach to Eighth Amendment
violations can be illustrated with a simple model. For the purposes
of this discussion, let us assume that for any given offender O there
is a constitutional punishment P, representing a term of imprison-
ment. In addition, let us also suppose that there are a set of uncon-
stitutional conditions, denoted as C, which all courts would agree
violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment.
Call, Constitutional Challenges to Prison Overcrowding: The Scientific Evidence of Harmful
Effects, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 313, 348-50 (1983).
122. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i) (2006) (“[C]rowding ... [must be] the primary
cause of the violation of a Federal right.”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)
(setting forth the two-step process for identifying an Eighth Amendment violation in the
prison context); see also supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
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Let us further assume that there are four different offenders—O1,
O2, O3, and O4—each of whom violate the same offense and may
constitutionally be subject to the same punishment P. Now imagine
that O1 resides in a jurisdiction that has determined by statute to
mandate a sentence of P + C for the stated offense. In the statute,
the condition C will be imposed at some specified time, T1, after the
offender begins her sentence. If the offender brings a challenge to
the sentence prior to T1, it will be adjudicated pursuant to principles
of proportionality sentencing litigation.125 She will be permitted to
argue that the imposition of this sentence is unconstitutional—
either because it is disproportionate to her offense or because it
violates basic standards of decency. If she is successful, the State
will be prohibited from punishing her unless the State agrees solely
to punish her by imposition of P. If the State wishes to include C as
punishment for her offense, it will be forbidden from punishing her
at all.
Offender O2 resides in the same state as O1, but he brings a chal-
lenge to his sentence after T1 and therefore after imposition of con-
dition C. Under current doctrine, he would not be able to pursue a
remedy of release. Instead, he would be limited to seeking damages
for the harm occasioned by imposition of unconstitutional condition
C. Thus, under the same statute dispensing the same punishment,
O2 would be subjected to a greater, and constitutionally excessive,
amount of punishment, whereas O1 would not.
Now imagine that O3 resides in a jurisdiction in which the statute
specifying the punishment for the same offense provides a term of
imprisonment P. After being sentenced, O3 is placed by the State’s
department of corrections in a prison in which, as a result of the
deliberate indifference of supervisory officials,126 there is a substan-
tial likelihood that, by time T1, he will be subjected to condition of
confinement C. Perhaps the prison is overcrowded, exceedingly dan-
gerous, or chronically understaffed. Regardless of the cause, so long
as it is attributable to the officials’ deliberate indifference, O3 also
may bring a legal challenge and ask a judge to require the State to
125. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
126. This standard of culpability has been established by Supreme Court Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1981); Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-05 (1976).
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reduce the likelihood of C occurring to a constitutionally acceptable
level, or else to release O3 from custody.127 If the State ignores the
court order and continues to impose condition C on O3 without
taking any measures to reduce the risk of C occurring,128 the State
may not continue to punish O3, and he must be released.129
Finally, imagine that offender O4 resides in the same jurisdiction
as O3, and the statute specifying the punishment for the same
offense provides a term of imprisonment P. O4, however, is placed in
a different prison than O3. In this prison, just as for O3, the deliber-
ate indifference of supervisory officials has created a constitution-
ally unacceptable risk that O4 will experience condition C, but no
legal challenge has been brought. At time T1, O4 experiences con-
dition C—perhaps she is raped or beaten by a correction officer who
has a history of such abuse in the past. O4 brings a challenge to the
imposition of condition C at T1. For precision, we can denote this
particular imposition of condition C as C1, to distinguish it from
future potential impositions of C. Pursuant to well-established
Eighth Amendment law,130 O4 may be able to recover damages for
the imposition of C1,131 but she may not seek release.132 Her remedy
for the concrete imposition of C1 is limited in a way that O1 and O3’s
remedy is not. And because the State may continue to impose
127. There is an important way in which this is oversimplified. O2 does not have a personal
right to release in the same way that O1 does. If a court orders a prisoner release because of
overcrowding, it usually leaves to the State the decision as to whom to release from which
institutions. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1939-41 (2011) (finding that a court
order specifying the means of correcting the constitutional violation—prisoner release—was
narrowly drawn because, among other things, it allowed the State to ascertain which
prisoners to release). Nonetheless, if the State cannot reduce the risk of condition C to a
sufficient level, theoretically all prisoners, including O2, have a right to release.
128. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (establishing that a prison official
may be held liable for an Eighth Amendment violation absent taking “reasonable measures”
to address the substantial risk of a constitutional violation).
129. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922 (noting that persistent and uncorrected constitutional
violations in a prison context may be appropriately remedied by ordering the release of
prisoners to reduce the total prisoner population).
130. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
131. Any claim for damages may be limited by the doctrine of qualified immunity, which
protects officials from monetary liability when existing law does not make clear the
unlawfulness of their conduct. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).
132. Of course, she may challenge the ongoing risk of the imposition of C, much like O2, but
this is not a remedy for the past imposition of C1; it is a remedy for the potential future
imposition of C.
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punishment after the imposition of C1, both O2 and O4 are subjected
to an unconstitutional amount of punishment that exceeds what



















O1 P+C T1 T0 Release P
O2 P+C T1 >T1 Damages P + C1
O3 P T1 >T0, <T1 Release P
O4 P T1 >T1 Damages P + C1
We can make this concrete by returning to the example that
began this Part—prison rape. As a family member of an incarcer-
ated woman remarked, “[b]eing raped is not part of their sentence
.... She should’ve been the first to come home.”133 Current Eighth
Amendment doctrine agrees with this common-sense observation,
though only to a point. The doctrine refuses to sanction the use of
abusive conditions such as sexual assault as a mode of punish-
ment,134 either directly holding or implying that given a choice
between imposing an inhumane and disproportionate punishment
and imposing no punishment at all, it is preferable not to punish. By
contrast, once a prisoner has been subjected ex post to the exact
mode of punishment that would be condemned ex ante as inhumane
and illegal, courts do not entertain the prospect of ordering release
ex post. That is, even though we can agree before the fact that the
State lacks authority to impose this particular punishment, once a
state actor has imposed such a punishment, courts treat the State’s
authority as unchanged.
At least one caveat is in order when comparing these different
schemes for remedying violations of the Constitution. The third
offender, O3, who experiences ongoing conditions of confinement
that pose an unconstitutionally high risk of future harm, does not
necessarily receive an individualized remedy in the manner of the
133. Kaylee Noborikawa, Female Inmates to Return to Isles, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN
(Aug. 19, 2009), http://archives.starbulletin.com/content/20090819_Female_inmates_to_
return_to_isles.
134. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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other offenders. Prisoner release orders are last-gasp options for
judges who have given governmental entities every other avenue for
coming into compliance with constitutional norms.135 Even in the
rare instances in which release orders are entered, they are not
individualized in the way that the remedies for O2 and O4 are. A
judge will leave it to the State to determine which prisoners must
be released to reduce the risk to a constitutional level.136
Despite this caveat, however, the basic flaw remains because the
logic of a prisoner release order is that the government must choose
between not punishing at all or punishing in a manner consistent
with the Constitution. Release orders force this choice on the State,
as does proportionality jurisprudence.137 It is only for offenders in O2
and O4’s situation, however, that the choice need not be made.
Taking these principles into account results in a disparate range
of maximum permissible sentences that offenders may experience
for the same conduct. For some of these offenders, the total sentence
they experience will be unconstitutional, but this will not protect the
offender from additional and excessive punishment. The solution
proposed here is to recognize that when objectively excessive
conditions of confinement are imposed on a prisoner, beyond what
is tolerable from the perspective of a civilized society, the State that
imposed such conditions should not be free to proceed with punish-
ment apace. This requires some recognition that, in this circum-
stance, the severity of the offender’s sentence has changed. And
depending on the seriousness of the constitutional violation, either
a release or a reduction in the term of years remaining on the
offender’s sentence is an appropriate remedy that would provide for
a more consistent and coherent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Later in this Article, I address some of the complexities of recog-
nizing a remedy of release—the forum in which it must be raised
and the need to determine how to make particular abuse commensu-
rate with particular lengths of confinement. But it is worthwhile to
note where we have traveled until now. I have described an Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence that both recognizes treatment within
prison as “punishment” and, in certain cases, affirms that such
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (2006).
136. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1939-41 (2011).
137. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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punishment may be unconstitutionally excessive or inhumane. At
the same time, I have described a remedial scheme that operates to
permit the State to impose punishment on some offenders beyond
what the Constitution allows, simply because of when that punish-
ment is distributed. Therefore, I have proposed that we strive to
treat similarly situated offenders similarly by recognizing that, in
some instances, either a release from custody or a shorter period of
imprisonment is an appropriate remedy for the imposition of uncon-
stitutional conditions of confinement.
III. RELEASE AS REMEDY THROUGH THE LENS OF PUNISHMENT
PHILOSOPHY
To this point, I have focused primarily on how the remedy of
release is consistent with, if not mandated by, Eighth Amendment
doctrine. This Part discusses why the remedy proposed here also
conforms with well-accepted notions of punishment theory. It does
so under the assumption that there is some connection between
what philosophers or theorists call punishment and what the Eighth
Amendment regulates. Some might believe that a condition could be
punishment for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment but not for
the purposes of theory because the Constitution is addressed to
different concerns than is punishment philosophy. But if that is the
case, then punishment theory has nothing to say one way or another
about the Eighth Amendment remedy I propose here. Absent good
reason to suppose such a sharp separation of punishment theory
and practice, I assume here that if we call something punishment
for the purposes of philosophy, we should assume it also is regulated
by the Eighth Amendment, and vice versa. 
This raises important questions because although Eighth
Amendment doctrine quite clearly contemplates that, for the pur-
poses of the Constitution, abusive treatment of prisoners by cor-
rections officials is punishment under the Eighth Amendment,138
philosophers are more ambivalent about whether such treatment
truly constitutes punishment.139 Theorists seem to agree, or at least
138. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S 97, 102-05 (1976).
139. It should not be surprising or upsetting that there is this gap between theory and
practice. Lawyers and philosophers have different needs for a theory of punishment—lawyers
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assume, that sentencing determinations made by legislatures and
judges are properly considered punishment and that confinement is
punishment, at least when imposed for the purpose of punish-
ment.140 But whether the actions of individual corrections officials
who administer prisons also constitute punishment remains rela-
tively undertheorized.141 Although doctrine may be clear, the theo-
retical dispute is nonetheless relevant.142
A. Conditions of Confinement as “Punishment”
There is wide agreement that confinement for violations of the
criminal law is itself punishment.143 One could start with H.L.A.
Hart’s classic definition of punishment,144 which looks to five factors:
(1) the imposition of pain or something unpleasant; (2) for an offense
contrary to legal rules; (3) on an offender or supposed offender;
(4) by a person who intends to administer such punishment; and
need to have one to decide when particular rights are implicated, whereas philosophers need
to understand what kind of state power must be justified. See 1 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE
GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW 226-27 (2007).
140. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment, 74 SOC. RES.
307, 329 (2007) (discussing the virtues of randomization in the criminal system and observing
that correctional departments could assign prisoners to security levels based on random
draws and provide access to health programs based on randomization); Alice Ristroph, Desert,
Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1342 (2006)
(identifying the drawbacks of retributivism, including the “risk that punitive authority will
be abused” and the cost of incarceration on communities from which offenders come).
141. Although not directly addressing the theoretical question, David Garland has called
attention to the central role that correctional officials play in penal practice and in redefining
the meaning of punishment. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 182-89
(1990). The question of “who” may punish is different than the question of whether
punishment must be intentionally imposed, as opposed to knowingly, recklessly, or
foreseeably imposed. See Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 17. One could accept
as a theoretical matter that individual correction officials punish, but only when they act
intentionally. Of course, under Eighth Amendment doctrine, officials may inflict punishment
through reckless or knowing conduct as well as intentional conduct.
142. Those Justices, including Justice Thomas, who object to the extension of the Eighth
Amendment to conditions of confinement make some of the same arguments as those few
theorists who have directly addressed this question and found that conditions cannot be
punishment. E.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40-42 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
143. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1976) (“It is unquestioned that
‘[c]onfinement in a prison is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment standards.’” (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978))).
144. Hart used that word cautiously. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-6
(2d ed. 2008).
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(5) within the framework of a legitimate legal authority.145 Under
this understanding of punishment, confinement itself clearly meets
the definition. This is so even though incarceration can be “ambigu-
ous”146 or unjust in particular circumstances.147
Characterizing the conditions that are imposed during confine-
ment—the treatment of offenders who are incarcerated—is arguably
a more difficult question. Popular conceptions of punishment cer-
tainly would include the conditions of confinement as well as the
confinement itself.148 Prisons are often thought to play a role in
punishment because they are thought to incapacitate.149 As Nicola
Lacey has argued, in the United States there may be a historic
tendency toward thinking of punishment as degrading, inasmuch as
the history of punishment in the United States is replete with
instances of “levelling down of punishment” or a “levelling up of
harshness.”150 Strict conditions of confinement are part of making
punishment degrading, at least in popular conception.151
Conditions of confinement also fit loosely within Hart’s conception
of punishment. This is easier to see if one starts with the conditions
that are expected as part of incarceration—limited privileges,
limited movement, limited freedom in exercising daily choices, and
literal physical restraint. These conditions easily satisfy the first
factor—it is at least unpleasant, if not painful, to be deprived of
one’s autonomy. As to the second factor, it depends on whether the
imposition “for” violation of a legal rule implies a “but for” causative
mechanism—in which case, conditions of confinement, even abusive
ones, qualify—or if they require a tighter connection between the
violation and the condition. However, at the very broadest level of
145. Id. at 4-5. Hart’s version of punishment focuses on objective factors: an offender who
commits a crime to obtain shelter and other minimum necessities is still being punished, even
if she subjectively experiences confinement as beneficial. FLETCHER, supra note 139, at 227-
28. This “objectivist” approach to measuring punishment has recently been called into
question in literature that I detail in Part III.C, infra.
146. It can be intended to punish, provide space for treatment, or incapacitate. FLETCHER,
supra note 139, at 226.
147. Id. at 264. Even if the person being punished is innocent, “then the sanction remains
punishment, though unjust punishment.” Id. at 231.
148. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
149. Richard Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70-73 (2005).
150. NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT IN
CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 32-35,39 (2008).
151. Id. at 32-35.
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generality, the particular limitations that characterize different
prisons are certainly considered to be “for” transgressions of the
criminal law, even if conditions are not tailored to precise crimes.
The third, fourth, and fifth factors also appear to be readily met for
expected conditions of confinement. They are imposed on offenders
or supposed offenders by corrections officials who intend to enforce
the restrictions inherent to incarceration. And they are adminis-
tered within a legitimate legal framework. Thus, it is not surprising
that many punishment philosophers recognize at least implicitly
that conditions of confinement are part of the punishment meted out
by the State.152
B. Abusive Conditions as Unjust Punishment
Even though conditions of confinement appear consistent with
theoretical conceptions of punishment, the question surely arises:
In what way can the physical or sexual abuse of a prisoner by a
correction officer be considered punishment? For instance, one
might argue that when a correction officer beats a prisoner, it is not
in “response to” or “because of” a particular violation but a response
to the simple fact that the offender is incarcerated and subject to the
whims of the officer. To understand why this critique is not dis-
positive, it is useful to focus on the distinction between just and
unjust punishment. Let us imagine a judge who sentences all black
offenders to twice as much imprisonment as white offenders. Surely,
everyone would agree that this sentence constitutes punishment of
the white and black offenders.153 But the increased period of
152. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 100, 118 (1970) (recognizing that “hard treatment” in prison is one aspect of
the expressive dimension of punishment); see also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD FRASE,
PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW 148 (2009) (noting that some discipline in
prison is “clearly intended as (further) punishment”); Michael Tonry & Norval Morris,
Interchangeability of Punishments in Principle, in THINKING ABOUT PUNISHMENT 428-32
(Michael Tonry ed., 2009) (pointing out that seeking precise equivalence in punishment is
complicated by fact that suffering imposed will differ based on the kind of prison or the
attitude of prison administrators).
153. For instance, leaving sentencing entirely to the discretion of a judge may be “lawless”
or arbitrary, but no one would deny that imprisonment under such a regime constitutes
punishment. See generally Marvin Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1
(1972).
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sentencing for black offenders cannot be said to be “for” a violation
of a legal rule, at least in the close-knit way that would deny the
characterization of abusive conditions of confinement as punish-
ment. The judge may exercise discretion in sentencing; when the
judge abuses that discretion by acting in a racist manner, he has
punished unjustly. It would be incoherent to say, however, that he
has not punished.
One could similarly argue that a correction officer who beats a
prisoner because the offender has irritated him in some trivial way
has punished the prisoner in an unjust way. The fact of confinement
contemplates that officers will have to use some amount of force to
confine offenders—this is why the Eighth Amendment permits the
imposition of de minimis force or force that is reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain order and security within the prison
walls.154 But when the officer exceeds that discretion, much like the
judge, he has certainly punished unjustly. To deny this connection
would be to treat punishment solely as confinement and not as the
restraints that are imposed with confinement—the limitation on
visits, on recreation, and on freedom of association or speech or
movement within the prison.
The foregoing suggests that if confinement and the expected
conditions found therein are punishment, then conditions that fall
outside of those expectations should also be considered punishment,
unjust though it may be. For the most part, however, punishment
theorists have not addressed this particular question. This is not for
lack of a general interest in determining “who” may punish. Alon
Harel and James Q. Whitman, for example, have focused on the
distinction between state actors who may inflict sanctions and
private actors who, on some accounts, should not be authorized to
inflict sanctions.155 For these theorists, the “State” is an entity com-
posed of all of its actors—legislators, judges, prison officials—to be
distinguished from private individuals who have no state agency.
154. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). 
155. Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Argument from
Moral Burdens, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2629, 2631 (2007) [hereinafter Harel, Moral Burdens];
Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Case Against Privately
Inflicted Sanctions, 14 LEGAL THEORY 113, 115 (2008) [hereinafter Harel, Privately Inflicted
Sanctions]; James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1088-89 (1998).
2012] RELEASE AS REMEDY FOR EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT 1613
There is no cause, however, for distinguishing between the state
actors who may or may not punish.156 Nothing about Whitman or
Harel’s skepticism of private actors as punishers suggests that state
officials are incapable of punishing via state authority, although
some of the same dangers inherent in delegating to private individu-
als may be present when delegating to individual correction
officials.157 Indeed, Whitman at least seems to accept implicitly that
correction officials administer punishment.158
When theorists do focus on the state apparatus of punishment,
most focus their attention on legislators and judges as proper
punishers.159 But if these state agents may punish, it is unclear why
executive officials who run prisons may not. It cannot be because of
concerns about the potential for arbitrariness when punishment is
dispensed by corrections officials, for some of the same concerns of
arbitrariness are present with legislators and judges.160 There is
always the risk that those we trust to impose punishment will
betray that trust.
More fundamentally, the accepted view that legislators and
judges are authorized to distribute punishment, if combined with
the view that the executive—through its prison system—is not so
authorized, raises the question of what precisely corrections officials
are authorized to do. Imagine, for instance, a statute authorized a
judge to sentence an offender to a prison term “under such condi-
tions and for so long as the director of the Department of Correc-
tions shall determine appropriate.” Clearly, under these circum-
stances, we would view the director of the corrections department
to have been delegated a punishment role by the legislature.
156. Much of Harel’s argument is devoted to exploring the “moral burdens” that are
imposed on private individuals who are asked to punish in the name of the State. Harel,
Moral Burdens, supra note 155, at 2637-44. Thus, in some respects, although his argument
opposes the role of private actors in punishment, it admits of the possibility that they may be
involved in punishment.
157. One difference is that the State retains the power and authority to control the actions
of prison officials, at least in theory.
158. Whitman contrasts the lack of state control over privately inflicted sanctions with
prisons, “[h]owever monstrous they may have become,” because the State has management
duties for which it may be held accountable. Whitman, supra note 155, at 1091; see also id.
at 1092 (finding democratic legitimacy in the fact that state punishment is administered by
“criminal justice professionals”).
159. See, e.g., Harel, Privately Inflicted Sanctions, supra note 155, at 127, 130.
160. See Ristroph, supra note 140, at 1296.
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Frankly, the hypothesized statute is not all that different from
sentencing schemes in which executive agencies administer good
time or parole determinations, or with indeterminate sentencing.161
In any event, in more common determinate sentencing schemes, the
only difference between the hypothesized statute and actual
statutes is that the latter specify terms of years. In both circum-
stances, the legislature is leaving to the executive corrections
system the determination of the conditions of detention, and the
range both within and without states is quite broad.
C. The “Subjectivist” Debate as Applied to Abusive Conditions
Until now, I have postponed consideration of the debate in pun-
ishment theory recently spawned by the important work of Adam
Kolber, John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan
Masur, all of whom have focused attention on the experience of
punishment. Kolber has elaborated the ways in which different
offenders will experience punishment differently, whether via fine
or incarceration, and has argued that punishment theorists and
policymakers should take these differing subjective experiences into
account when determining whether a particular punishment is
just.162 Indeed, Kolber argues that retributive principles of propor-
tionality are undermined if we do not take into account the fact that
different offenders will experience precisely the same punishment
differently.163 There is much more to it than that, but I take it that
Kolber would agree that the treatment of offenders by corrections
officials constitutes punishment or requires justification by the
161. In traditional indeterminate sentencing schemes, judges are responsible for looking
to principles of rehabilitation and incapacitation to determine the appropriate maximum and
minimum prison term. Frase, supra note 149, at 70-71. Frase recognizes that correction
officials and parole boards then take over to assess what treatment or programming is
appropriate in prison and when it is safe for the offender to be released. Id.
162. See Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565,
1567-69 (2009) [hereinafter Kolber, Comparative Nature]; Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra
note 17, at 184.
163. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 17, at 211.
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State.164 Kolber himself uses the suffering caused by malicious
wardens as an example of punishment.165
In a similar vein, Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur have
sparked a renewed debate over the extent to which hedonic
adaptation should be incorporated into punishment practice and
theory.166 They focus on the disparate ways in which the length of
incarceration affects the subjective well-being of offenders. While in
prison, offenders experience the greatest degree of pain at the
beginning of their incarceration. They subsequently adapt and—
because they have adjusted their baseline level of pleasure—
experience less unhappiness as the period of incarceration pro-
gresses.167 At the same time, Bronsteen and his colleagues also
argue that after an offender’s sentence has ended, the negative
effects of imprisonment linger, but these effects are not necessarily
correlated with the length of imprisonment—the metric by which
most judge the proportionality of punishment.168 
Distinguishing themselves from Kolber, Bronsteen and his col-
leagues make what they perceive to be a narrower argument: that
the adaptation of offenders to the experience of punishment should
be taken into account by legislators and others.169 Like Kolber, I
take it they would agree with the proposition that abusive treat-
ment by corrections officials constitutes punishment or must be
justified. Inasmuch as Bronsteen and his colleagues focus on the
negative experience of punishment,170 their understanding of
164. Whether Kolber would formally call treatment by officials “punishment,” or would
require that it be justified by the State whether it is punishment or something else, may be
up for grabs. In a recent article, he argues that both purposeful punishment and the foreseen
consequences of such punishment must be justified by the State, whether the foreseeable
consequences are formally considered punishment or something else. See Kolber,
Unintentional Punishment, supra note 17.
165. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 17, at 197.
166. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Happiness and
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (2009) [hereinafter Bronsteen et al., Happiness];
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Retribution and the
Experience of Punishment, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1463, 1466-67 (2010) [hereinafter Bronsteen et
al., Retribution].
167. Bronsteen et al., Happiness, supra note 166, at 1047-48.
168. Id. at 1038.
169. Bronsteen et al., Retribution, supra note 166, at 1464-65.
170. Id. at 1469, 1472.
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punishment would appear to include abuse by state officials while
an offender is in prison.171
Kolber and Bronsteen’s conceptions of punishment, construed
broadly, focus on the importance of the subjective experience of
offenders while in prison. The remedy I propose here rests on a
narrower foundation because it requires an underlying finding of an
Eighth Amendment violation. Whereas Kolber and Bronsteen would
find punishment based solely on the subjective experience of of-
fenders, the Eighth Amendment requires a finding of an objective
degree of harm.172 Whereas those theorists tend to view prison
conditions that are the product of intentional and unintentional
state action similarly, Eighth Amendment doctrine requires that
punitive conditions be the result of the conduct of state officials with
a culpable state of mind.173 Despite these differences, some of the
critics of Kolber and Bronsteen might object to my contention that
abusive treatment by corrections officials should be considered
“punishment.” It is to these critics that I now turn.
Kolber and Bronsteen’s propositions have been subject to strident
criticism by some retributivists who argue that the subjective
experience of offenders has little, if any, role in a retributive account
of just punishment, in part because the subjective experience of
offenders should not be considered part of punishment.174 Most
notably, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, and David Gray have argued
that although subjective experiences might properly play some
limited role in sentencing determinations, subjective experience is
irrelevant to the extent that retributive theory relates to the justif-
ication for punishment.175 These authors are somewhat ambivalent,
however, about whether corrections officials mete out punishment
by their treatment of offenders. On one hand, Markel, Flanders, and
Gray argue that abusive treatment that is unauthorized need not be
171. Bronsteen and his colleagues do seek to distinguish their position from Kolber, in
some way, by distancing themselves from a “subjective” focus on how individual prisoners
experience punishment and instead focusing on how hedonic adaptation operates in a “typical”
manner. Id. at 1469 n.28.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
173. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
174. See generally Markel & Flanders, supra note 18; Gray, supra note 18; see also Markel,
Flanders & Gray, supra note 18, at 619-20.
175. See Markel & Flanders, supra note 18, at 909.
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equated with “justified, authorized punishment” so as to adjust the
term of imprisonment by early release.176 Instead, the State can take
moral responsibility by providing “compensation, apology, injunctive
relief, or administrative reform.”177 
Even as Markel, Flanders, and Gray stake out a position that
abusive treatment need not be considered punishment, they seem
to accept that some treatment by corrections officials may be so
excessive and so abusive so as to interfere with the expressive
purpose of punishment and violate the offender’s dignity.178 And at
least at the extremes, they appear ready to deny the State the power
to inflict further punishment on an individual who has suffered
abuse that violates the Eighth Amendment and is the result of
systemic cruelty.179 Thus, Markel, Flanders, and Gray might accept
that in some cases release is an appropriate remedy for discrete
Eighth Amendment violations.
There appear to be two strands of criticism emanating from
Markel, Flanders, and Gray regarding “who” may punish. First,
there is a claim that abusive, malicious, or sadistic treatment
cannot be punishment because it is unauthorized and hence unjus-
tified.180 On this view, it is simply “unjust treatment” and not
punishment.181 This critique is in conflict with Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, a minor point if one accepts that the Eighth Amend-
ment’s definition of punishment may depart from philosophical
176. See Markel & Flanders, supra note 18, at 960-61; see also Gray, supra note 18, at 1651
(arguing, for example, that prison rape is not punishment because it is not inflicted by the
“right person” for the “right reason”); Markel, Flanders & Gray, supra note 18, at 619-20.
177. See Markel & Flanders, supra note 18, at 961; see also Gray, supra note 18, at 1652
(treating suffering caused by a sadistic warden as criminal because to do otherwise would
“deny claims for protection from those who suffer at the hands of sadistic officials as long as
they are released when their suffering thresholds are reached”); Markel, Flanders & Gray,
supra note 18, at 620.
178. Markel & Flanders, supra note 18, at 957-58; see also Chad Flanders, Retribution and
Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 95-96, 104, 115 (2010) (describing abusive prison conditions and
suggesting that under some retributive theories, humiliating and degrading prison conditions
result in unjust punishment); David Gray & Jonathan Huber, Retribution for Progressives:
A Response to Professor Flanders, 70 MD. L. REV. 141, 164 (2010) (acknowledging that
degrading prison conditions are harsh and therefore “disproportionate or otherwise
unjustified”).
179. Markel & Flanders, supra note 18, at 961 n.193; Markel, Flanders & Gray, supra note
18, at 620 n.46.
180. See Markel & Flanders, supra note 18, at 961; Gray, supra note 18, at 1651.
181. Gray, supra note 18, at 1649.
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conceptions of punishment. On the other hand, if the critique is that
abusive treatment is not punishment because it is not “proper,”
“just,” or “justified” punishment, that is a different matter en-
tirely.182 For it seems uncontradicted that punishment, imposed by
whomever, can be “unjust treatment” precisely because it is without
justification or, in other words, not “proper” punishment.183 Other-
wise, it is unclear that we could ever say that a particular punish-
ment is unjustified or improper—the test certainly cannot be
whether a “theory of punishment needs to or should aspire to
justify” a particular treatment.184 This is, after all, exactly what we
are trying to determine: what punishment can, or should, be
justified and what punishment cannot.
The second criticism appears to be a remedial one. Markel and
Flanders assert, with some caveats, that the proper remedy for
abusive treatment is not an adjustment of sentencing period but
other measures such as criminal prosecution, damages, injunctive
relief, and reform.185 To the extent that Markel and Flanders are
claiming that these remedies are inconsistent with an adjustment
of the period of punishment, there is no obvious reason as a matter
of theory for this to be so. Instead, if they mean to say that those
other remedies are preferable to early release, this would presum-
ably depend on case-specific determinations. It may also be that
their argument is tied to their critique of the subjective account of
punishment offered by Kolber and Bronsteen. But because the
Eighth Amendment violations I address here do not depend on
subjective experience of prison conditions, and because I am arguing
for tailored, not broad, punishment reductions, it may be that the
objections raised by Markel, Flanders, and Gray (in their collective
work) do not apply here.
182. See Markel, Flanders & Gray, supra note 18, at 620 (stating that even if the state is
responsible for abusive treatment, the harm caused to prisoners need not be justified by
retributivist theories of punishment).
183. Id. (stating that if abusive treatment experienced in prison is actionable under the
Constitution, then it should be remedied “not because these harms are punishment but
precisely because they are not”).
184. Markel & Flanders, supra note 18, at 1649; Markel, Flanders & Gray, supra note 18,
at 620.
185. See Markel & Flanders, supra note 18, at 969.
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Gray’s remedial critique is slightly different. He claims that if we
call abusive treatment by corrections officials punishment, offenders
will be left without traditional remedies like tort claims or other
compensatory schemes, and the officials who mete out such abuse
will be immune from prosecution from criminal acts because they
are immunized as punishers.186 Gray never explains why this must
be so—why one who inflicts unjustified punishment may not be held
personally accountable for their actions. No court has ever sug-
gested that those who inflict punishment on behalf of the state take
on the cloth of sovereign immunity as a result. Legislators, prosecu-
tors, juries, and judges have different kinds of immunity based on
their function within our liberal democracy, but their role as
punishers has not been an articulated justification.187 Gray’s thesis,
by contrast, permits the State to pay rent to continue punishing a
prisoner who has been punished by state officials more than the
State could ever have imposed ex ante.
Gray also seems to reject the proposition made here—that those
who experience unjustified and excessive punishment be released
earlier than their original sentence calls for—because it implies that
release makes the offender whole and therefore the offender aban-
dons any claim “that abuse at the hands of other prisoners should
be stopped, much less prosecuted.”188 But this assumption is ques-
tionable. First, based on controlling standing doctrine, the offender
will have a very difficult time seeking injunctive relief that stops
abuse, even if the offender stays within the prison walls.189 As for
abandoning any “personal” claim that the rapist be prosecuted,
there is no such thing—victims of crime have no personal claim that
can mandate the prosecution of a perpetrator.190 In any event, it is
not obvious, as has been discussed above,191 that early release from
prison would make such an offender whole. Therefore, there may be
no inconsistency at all with permitting offenders to retain their
186. Gray, supra note 18, at 1650-51.
187. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-43 (2009) (reviewing the bases for
absolute immunity).
188. Gray, supra note 18, at 1651.
189. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).
190. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766 (2005).
191. See supra note 188.
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personal claims even as the State is prohibited from punishing them
beyond what they deserve.
To some extent, Markel, Flanders, and Gray’s objections reflect
their retributivist-informed definition of punishment. Individually
and collectively, they have described punishment variously as
(1) deprivations “justified, measured, and described solely in objec-
tive or perhaps intersubjective terms by reference to the offender’s
culpability in a crime” but not “excessive” or “incidental” suf-
fering;192 (2) “those intended, coercive condemnatory deprivations
inflicted against persons in response to their crimes and by state
officials who are authorized to inflict those deprivations;”193 or
(3) hardship “authorized, intentionally imposed, and proximately
caused by the state.”194 If these definitions exhaust our concept of
punishment, however, then it is hard to see how there is any space
for unjustified punishment, except perhaps for excessively harsh or
lenient prison sentences or prison conditions specifically imposed by
statute.195
At this point, it is well to recall Hart’s caveat to his five factors of
punishment. For even Hart acknowledged that although these
factors were elements of the “standard” case of punishment, there
were other examples of punishment that did not fit within the def-
inition, including punishment of persons “who neither are in fact
nor supposed to be offenders” and “decentralised sanctions ... for
breaches of legal rules imposed or administered otherwise than by
officials.”196 Hart felt it necessary to acknowledge these as examples
of punishment to avoid what he called the “definitional stop” in
192. Gray, supra note 18, at 1670, 1692-93.
193. Markel, Flanders & Gray, supra note 18, at 619-20.
194. Id. at 618.
195. See Markel, Flanders & Gray, supra note 18, at 615 (arguing that the key for defining
punishment is a connection to democratic processes of decision making). There may be some
room here for debate among these authors. Flanders, for instance, has acknowledged that
brutal prison conditions could be considered part of punishment but also has suggested that
proportionality analysis is appropriate only for challenging sentence length, not conditions.
See Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism Be Progressive? A Reply to Professor Gray and
Jonathan Huber, 70 MD. L. REV. 166, 169 (2010). And Markel has argued that retributivist
principles should inform the Eighth Amendment by providing a remedy when an innocent
person is punished. See Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the
Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1219 (2009).
196. HART, supra note 144, at 5.
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debates about theories of punishment.197 He recognized that in the
debate about why punishment is justified, it is too easy to rest on
definitions because it avoids the difficult question of why we have
chosen “a system of punishment under which measures painful to
individuals are to be taken against them only when they have
committed an offence.”198 For Hart, “[n]o account of punishment can
afford to dismiss this question with a definition.”199 David Garland
has made a similar critique of punishment theory, noting that it
does not concern itself with punishment as practiced because it is
not part of the “oversimplified conception of ‘punishment’ that phi-
losophers conventionally use.”200 In the end, whether Gray, Markel,
and Flanders’ objections invoke the definitional stop that Hart was
so wary of, they are insufficient to demonstrate that treatment of
offenders can never be considered punishment, whether just or
unjustified.
D. Ramifications of Treating Abusive Conditions as Unjust 
Punishment
If one accepts that treatment within prison is punishment, it
seems that whatever one’s account for why punishment is justified,
the treatment previously described may not be deemed proper
punishment. Recall that treatment may violate the Eighth Amend-
ment if it is disproportionate or inconsistent with basic principles of
dignity.201 For retributivists, punishment that is so excessive as to
be disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment cannot be just.202
Nor can a theory of punishment that rests on the moral desert of the
offender embrace the application of a punishment that is outside the
bounds of accepted social conceptions of decency—whether one
views retributivism as establishing the floor, the ceiling, or the
exact amount of punishment.203 
197. Id.
198. Id. at 6.
199. Id.
200. David Garland, Sociological Perspectives on Punishment, 14 CRIME & JUST. 115, 118-
19 (1991).
201. See supra Part I.B.
202. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
203. As many commentators have noted, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence most likely
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Of course, principles of proportionality and dignity are relevant
to consequentialists as well, as Richard Frase has argued.204 Thus,
when the burden and cost of a particular punishment to an offender
outweigh the benefit to society, it might be said to violate a principle
of “ends disproportionality.”205 And if a punishment less burdensome
to the defendant may achieve the same goals for the public as a
more severe punishment, it might be said to violate a principle of
“means proportionality.”206 Here again, the punishments that are so
extreme as to be disproportionate or inconsistent with basic moral
judgments will generally impose a very high burden on the offender
that will not be parsimonious in the least and will rarely produce a
benefit sufficient to outweigh the significant costs to the offender.
For utilitarians, then, the abusive punishment described above
would be unjustified in almost every instance.207
In sum, the remedy I propose here is consistent with principles of
both doctrine and theory. It would serve to equalize treatment
between objectively similarly situated offenders and would be con-
sistent with a range of justifications for punishment. What remains
is to discuss in some detail how courts might effectuate this remedy,
and some of the practical costs and benefits that have yet to be
considered.
IV. EFFECTUATING THE REMEDY OF RELEASE
Although this remedy may be conceptually straightforward, it
would surely be complex in execution. It may be difficult to deter-
mine the forum in which such a request for release should be made
reflects a commitment to limited retributivism—in which principles of retributivism guide the
outermost limits of punishment. See Frase, supra note 149, at 77-78; Youngjae Lee, The
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 707-08 (2005);
Ristroph, supra note 140, at 1302. But retributivism can also be thought of as providing the
basis for judging what the minimum amount of punishment should be or assessing what
precise amount of punishment is appropriate. E.g., Lee, supra, at 711-12.
204. Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 592-93, 628 (2005).
205. Id. at 592-94.
206. Id. at 596.
207. Frase, for instance, recognizes that overcrowding of prisons can undermine
consequentialist goals—prisoners might leave prison more dangerous than when they
entered—and may also violate principles of humane treatment. Frase, supra note 149, at 73.
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and how to equate particular deprivations with a specific remedy.
Courts might rely on a framework similar to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines so that particular kinds of mistreatment are associated
with different levels of reductions in sentences.208 Courts may also
have difficulty determining whether proportionality principles or
evolving standards of decency should guide remedial determina-
tions, although it is worth recognizing that disproportionate sen-
tences can be said to implicitly violate evolving standards of
decency.209 It may also become necessary to distinguish between
conditions of confinement that are the result of systemic customs,
practices, or policies and those conditions that are imposed by
individual corrections officers acting without any facilitation from
senior corrections officials. In the former case, the disjunction
between remedies discussed above is more prominent.210 Indeed, it
might be said that the best way to equalize the treatment of the
hypothetical offenders described above is to limit the remedy of
release to offenders who experience unconstitutional conditions that
are closely tied to official custom, policy, or practice.
This Article cannot address all of these complexities, but ad-
dresses some of the most prominent ones as follows: First, I discuss
how the law of remedies relates to the proposal described here.
Then, I show that the basic task of a court in adjudicating this right
will not be so different from what courts do on an everyday basis in
criminal sentencing. Finally, I consider some of the practical costs
and benefits that accompany this remedy.
A. Accounting for the Law of Remedies
One might be willing to accept all of the foregoing propositions
but still be convinced that release is not the proper remedy for past
Eighth Amendment violations for reasons having nothing to do with
punishment doctrine or theory. To the extent we view release from
custody as equitable in nature, there are longstanding principles
that treat equitable remedies as available only as a last resort,
208. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006) (listing factors to be considered in imposing a
sentence under Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
209. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
210. See supra Part II.
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essentially when damages cannot provide sufficient compensation.
Legal remedies, or damages, are taken to be the presumption and
the grant of equity is a matter of discretion for a court to consider
when damages remedies are inadequate. The Supreme Court re-
cently described the discretionary standard as follows:
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irrepa-
rable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as mone-
tary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunc-
tion.211
Each of these requirements can be notoriously difficult to meet,
in large part because of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.212 Most
prominent is standing doctrine, which under City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons requires a plaintiff injured by past practices to show a like-
lihood of future injury before permitting the awarding of equitable
relief.213 The Court’s decision in Lyons is one of the most difficult
injunctive cases for plaintiffs to overcome because it has raised such
difficult standards for proving standing in civil rights cases.214 But
for the remedial proposal made here, standing does not appear to be
211. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
212. The Court is not the only institutional actor to create barriers to injunctive relief.
Congress has done so in particular contexts, with the Prison Litigation Reform Act one of the
most notable examples. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
213. 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).
214. David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted
Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1237. There is no need to recount the numerous cases
in which Lyons has been applied to bar injunctive relief. See, e.g., Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d
371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005) (dismissing plaintiff’s civil rights claim because it was “barred by the
standing limitations described in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons”). It is not, however, an
impossible barrier to overcome. See Fla. State Conference of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d
1153, 1163-1164 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding standing when “the injuries are foreseeable and the
expected results of unconscious and largely unavoidable human errors”). Even the Supreme
Court has minimized the reach of Lyons in recent cases involving “reverse-discrimination”
equal protection claims. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 718-719 (2007) (“The fact that it is possible that children of group members will
not be denied admission to a school based on their race—because they choose an
undersubscribed school or an oversubscribed school in which their race is an advantage—does
not eliminate the injury claimed.”); Rudovsky, supra, at 1237-38 (noting that standing
doctrine appeared to be liberalized in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)).
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a serious barrier because continuing to punish the prisoner after she
has experienced disproportionate or unjustified punishment is to
engage in an ongoing injury of constitutional dimension. For some
prisoners who have experienced serious abuse, an additional day in
prison will only compound the constitutional injury. By the same
token, the imposition of additional punishment in the future would
clearly qualify as irreparable injury sufficient to justify the provi-
sion of equitable relief.
Instead, what most prominently stands in the way of the relief
proposed here is the principle that, when damages are adequate,
injunctive relief should be denied.215 There are several reasons that
this objection can be overcome as well. First, courts have long
recognized that legal remedies are not a complete remedy for the
violation of a constitutional right.216 This is particularly the case
when the violation also involves physical injury or emotional
distress. Damages simply cannot purchase the right of the individ-
ual to be free from the treatment described here.217 Second, depend-
ing on how one conceptualizes the injury here, it may be that the
remedy of release is the only remedy that will come close to fully
addressing the past unconstitutional abuse. If one believes that an
abusive condition, in addition to the time already spent in prison,
has imposed a total punishment that is disproportionate to an
offender’s crime of conviction, then the remedy of release is neces-
sary not only to remedy the prior imposition of the abusive condition
but also to prevent any further punishment. Additional punishment
beyond that which is already disproportionate would quite clearly
constitute a distinct constitutional injury that can be most directly
remedied by release. Analogously, if someone is shown to be wrongly
incarcerated, no barrier exists to providing him compensation for
the years of unjust punishment he experienced and also ordering his
215. See MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. at 391 (setting forth a four-factor test that a
plaintiff must satisfy in order to obtain injunctive relief).
216. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable
Injury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1326 (2001).
217. See id. at 1328-30 (noting that when constitutional injuries are noneconomic and
therefore incapable of being fully remedied by damages, courts usually find that plaintiffs
have met the irreparable injury prong for injunctive relief); see also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY,
RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE AND THERAPY 241 (1979) (comparing the relative ease of compensating
individuals for wrongful imprisonment with the difficulty of compensating for torture or other
deprivations of dignity).
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release to prevent the imposition of any further unjust punish-
ment.218
Moreover, even if we think of the injury as a violation of concep-
tions of human dignity and the minimum requirements of a civil
society, subjecting an offender to inhumane treatment may also
justify release in addition to the awarding of damages, depending on
the nature of the treatment. In this respect, we might be more
concerned about injuries that are caused by systemic deficiencies
rather than an individual bad actor, especially if we are willing to
attribute those deficiencies to the State.219
Finally, there will be many cases in which the availability of
damages will simply not provide an adequate remedy. In some
cases, money damages will not be available because of immunities,
most prominently qualified immunity.220 Sovereign immunity also
may play a role in barring relief in some instances.221 In fact, the
Supreme Court has recently highlighted the availability of injunc-
tive relief as a reason to be less concerned about the unavailability
of monetary damages due to the immunity doctrine.222 Indeed, in
some sense the unavailability of damages relief under the Eleventh
Amendment heightens the need for injunctive relief because it
creates an “economically” irreparable injury to the plaintiff.223
There may also be statutory limitations on damages that make
injunctive relief a more appropriate remedy. The PLRA and its state
analogs, for instance, have provisions limiting the availability of
damages in prisoners’ rights litigation.224 Most notable is the
218. See, e.g., Tyler v. State, 28 Ill. Ct. Cl. 90, 91, 98 (1972) (releasing the plaintiff and
awarding him $6000 in compensation for wrongful incarceration).
219. See supra text accompanying note 213.
220. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 245 (2009).
221. See Karlan, supra note 216, at 1317.
222. Cf. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001) (finding that
sovereign immunity did not leave injured individuals with “no federal recourse against
discrimination” because injunctive relief was still available and United States could bring
damages claims); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756-57 (1999) (referring to availability of
injunctive and declaratory relief against state officers and ability to proceed against municipal
or local entities as an “important limit to the principle of sovereign immunity”).
223. Karlan, supra note 216, at 1313-14 (“My basic premise is that there is a paradox at
the heart of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence: The very mechanism by which
the Court seeks to enhance federalism and state autonomy may in fact channel litigation into
a form that imposes greater constraints on state action.”).
224. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006). For a state analog, see, for example, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15:1184 (2011).
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“limitation on recovery” provision of the PLRA, which states that
“[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner ... for mental
or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury.”225 Many courts have interpreted this
provision to require some physical injury before damages are
awarded for emotional injuries.226 And in the context of sexual
abuse, some courts have suggested that “isolated” instances of abuse
do not constitute “physical injury” under the PLRA.227 Thus,
although there is a general preference for damages over injunctive
remedies, both common law and statutory limitations on damages
in prisoners’ rights litigation will make injunctive relief more
appropriate in at least some instances.
All of this suggests that, although one must grapple with the law
of remedies to effectuate the proposal I make here, it does not make
the remedy of release unavailable. If anything, it merely calls for a
narrow scope for my proposal. In particular, the law might suggest,
consistent with previous discussion, that the remedy of release be
limited to those circumstances in which abusive treatment is the
product of widespread customs, practices, and not simply the iso-
lated misconduct of an individual corrections officer. In these
instances, an injunction calling for release will be properly directed
to state authorities who bear some responsibility both for adminis-
tering punishment and eliminating abusive conditions. Such a law
might also call for a limited remedy of release—essentially a frame-
work for deciding when abuses are serious enough that they
warrant a reduction in sentence in addition to whatever compensa-
tion an offender may receive. Finally, these considerations may also
suggest that there be some relationship between any financial
compensation an offender has received and any reduction in sen-
tence that might be ordered by a court.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
226. See, e.g., Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 2007); Royal v. Kautzky,
375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004); Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003);
Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2002).
227. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that an officer’s
solicitation of manual masturbation does not satisfy § 1997e(e)); Maxwell v. Talley, No.
4:07CV00669 SWW/BD, 2010 WL 3270757, at *2 (E.D. Ark. July 12, 2010).
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B. The Commensurability Problem
Even if a damages remedy is inadequate in certain contexts and
a court were to consider release as a potential remedy, there
remains a question concerning the circumstances in which release
would be appropriate. This implicates a different question than that
of the adequacy of damages and the presence of irreparable injury.
Instead, it requires some consideration of commensurability: How
does one measure the amount of imprisonment that equates to a
particular unconstitutional treatment? A prison rape, for instance,
might be “worth” X years imprisonment, whereas a physical beating
might equate to Y.
I will not purport to propose precisely how to balance these
considerations here, but it is important to note that courts are
familiar with the task. At sentencing, many courts will take into
account the offender’s prior treatment and reduce the sentence of
imprisonment. Under this analysis, courts have reduced sentences
when a defendant faced a high risk of abuse while in prison,228
actual abusive conditions of confinement,229 extremely restrictive
conditions of confinement,230 or sexual assault while awaiting
sentencing.231
Several aspects of these cases are notable. First, courts have
reduced sentences for abusive pretrial conditions of confinement
even when the sovereign dispensing the punishment was not the
228. In Koon v. United States, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that a sentencing
court may consider “susceptibility to abuse” in prison as a factor for a downward departure
in extraordinary or unusual circumstances. 518 U.S. 81, 111 (1996); see also United States v.
Wilke, 156 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that district court could consider defendant’s
sexual orientation and demeanor in considering a downward departure); United States v.
Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1990) (granting a downward departure when defendant
alleged that “while incarcerated an incident occurred in which ‘two tough male ... inmates
were attempting to coerce defendant by threats into becoming a male prostitute’”); United
States v. Ruff, 998 F. Supp. 1351, 1360 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that vulnerability to
victimization justifies downward departure, based on defendant’s particular circumstances).
229. United States v. Francis, 129 F. Supp. 2d 612, 619-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
230. United States v. Pressley, 345 F.3d 1205, 1219 (11th Cir. 2003) (remanding for district
court to consider a downward departure of two and a half years due to “extraordinary” facts:
individual spent five years in twenty-three-hour-a-day lockdown and had not been outside in
five years).
231. United States v. Rodriguez, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (holding that
the rape of a prisoner while in presentencing confinement by a correction officer justified a
downward departure).
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sovereign who maintained custody of the defendant before sentenc-
ing. Federal courts have done so when the defendant was held in a
county or state correctional facility232 and even in the custody of a
foreign sovereign.233 Second, the standard that lower courts appear
to use when deciding whether to reduce sentences for past abusive
conditions is very similar to the Eighth Amendment standard for
conditions of confinement challenges.234 Although courts do not
232. United States v. Hernandez-Santiago, 92 F.3d 97, 101 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that
the district court granted a downward departure of three levels based on defendant's twenty-
two month incarceration in a state facility, which was a “harsher incarceration”); Francis, 129
F. Supp. 2d at 616, 619-20.
233. United States v. Carty, 264 F.3d 191, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that conditions
of pretrial confinement in a foreign country could be considered for a downward departure
under the Sentencing Guidelines).
234. United States v. Pearson, No. 08-1129, 2009 WL 434843, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 20, 2009)
(stating that the conditions of pretrial confinement are not required to be considered, although
accepting the possibility that “extraordinarily harsh conditions of confinement might justify
a lowered sentence”); Pressley, 345 F.3d at 1218-19; United States v. Mateo, 299 F. Supp. 2d
201, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that a downward departure may be appropriate “where the
conditions in question are extreme to an exceptional degree and their severity falls upon the
defendant in some highly unique or disproportionate manner”); Francis, 129 F. Supp. 2d at
616-18 (granting a downward departure for “qualitatively different” conditions, which
included overcrowding, inadequate hygiene, spoiled and unsanitary food, an attempted
stabbing, loss of weight, prevalence of weapons, gang activity and dominance, and threats
from other inmates); United States v. Pacheco, 67 F. Supp. 2d 495, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(requiring that conditions be worse than those of other inmates at a facility to be considered
for a downward departure); United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D. Mass. 1997)
(deeming a downward departure appropriate when “an unusual factor makes the conditions
of confinement contemplated by the guidelines either impossible to impose or inappropriate”);
United States v. Sutton, 973 F. Supp. 488, 493-94 (D.N.J. 1997), aff’d, 156 F.3d 1226 (3d Cir.
1998) (recognizing that although pretrial detention is not punishment in the constitutional
sense, “pretrial detention in substandard conditions can have a punitive effect not
contemplated by the Guidelines.... [U]nusual pretrial confinement, however, in either length
or severity of condition, can properly be considered by the sentencing court”). The Sutton
Court went on to refuse a downward departure when the defendant failed to show that the
conditions were “atypical” as compared to other institutions. 973 F. Supp. at 494-95; see also
Andujar v. United States, No. 1:05cr-00422, 2009 WL 2169163, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. July 16,
2009) (finding that failure to raise conditions of confinement was not ineffective assistance
of counsel because there were no allegations of physical harm and there was no evidence that
conditions were “qualitatively or quantitatively worse than those experienced by other
defendants”); United States v. Valdes, No. CR.A. 01-068-JJF, Civ.A. 03-764-JJF, 2004 WL
234648, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2004) (“Moreover, those courts that have recognized the
authority to depart have only done so when the conditions of confinement are atypical or
extraordinary. Conditions of confinement that impact all defendants facing incarceration are
insufficient to warrant a downward departure.”); United States v. Brown, 95 F. Supp. 2d 277,
280 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (refusing to grant a downward departure when the “court cannot conclude
either that the length of time Mr. Brown spent in the various jails or the nature of the
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make an explicit connection to the Eighth Amendment, they appear
to be acting on the intuition that when offenders suffer treatment
that is beyond the bounds of constitutional permissibility, imposing
on the offender the same sentence as someone who did not suffer
such treatment would be improper. Finally, courts have recognized
that imposing this cost, even on a different sovereign, may create an
incentive to improve and monitor conditions of pretrial and pre-
sentencing detainees.235 One court explained the reasoning as
follows:
Given the character of the prison population, and the strict
regimen and tensions under which it is housed, the penal system
must accommodate, within fair limits, tolerance for a normal
level of shortcomings in the quality of certain services, as well
the vulnerability of some individuals to incidental inmate-to-
inmate and guard-to-inmate victimization that is not uncommon
in a custodial environment. The concept of what is “just punish-
ment” thus contemplates a prospective, empirical assessment,
necessarily imprecise, of the accumulation of reasonably
foreseeable, ordinary hardships and suffering that any given
offender is likely to experience in the typical case during the
course of a particular range of imprisonment.... Under the
preceding standards, occasional shoves and knocks arising from
necessary disciplinary encounters may fall within the realm of
the warranted physical contacts an inmate may expect to suffer
at the hands of prison guards during the ordinary course of
presentence confinement. However, a rape is not.236
Commensurability is a complex problem, but it is not impossible
to resolve judicially. Courts might decide that some instances of
abuse are so extreme that they justify immediate release, whereas
others will result in a modest reduction in sentence. There will be
problems of uniformity and consistency, but these problems are not
unique to this proposal.
conditions were so extraordinarily bad as to warrant a lesser sentence”); United States v.
Miranda, 979 F. Supp. 1040, 1044-45 (D.N.J. 1997) (stating that one hundred days of
confinement in “troublesome” conditions, although not enough to justify a downward
departure, were enough to question whether federal prisoners should continue to be housed
in a county facility).
235. Francis, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 619-20.
236. Mateo, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 210-11.
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C. Practical Considerations
If one accepts that the doctrinal and theoretical objections to the
remedy proposed here can be overcome, some benefits from adopting
the remedy are worth considering. The current approach to
remedying past Eighth Amendment violations has accomplished
little in terms of reducing the frequency of such violations.237 The
principal remedy is monetary. But even for prisoners who can
overcome the sometimes substantial barriers of qualified and
sovereign immunity, the remedy they obtain is often minimal and
rarely imposes any cost on either the individual officer or the
particular prison system.238 If part of the purpose of an Eighth
Amendment remedy is to deter the commission of such violations,
a remedy of release may prove to be a far more effective deterrent
for prison systems and, arguably, individual officers.
This is not to say that Eighth Amendment litigation has been
unsuccessful in preventing some extreme violations of offenders’
rights. Conditions of confinement litigation has alleviated some of
the most extreme overcrowding and medical inadequacies,239
assisted in the development of correctional norms and standards,240
and contributed to the internalization of these norms through a
professional corrections staff.241 Conditions of confinement litigation
has been successful for numerous reasons, including its potential to
expose officials to negative publicity, the increased funding that
normally accompanies court orders in institutional reform litigation,
and the availability of highly competent counsel.242
There are, however, limits to conditions of confinement litiga-
tion—in large part because of the hesitance of courts to interpret the
237. Cf. Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 639, 724 (1993) (discussing the difficulties of eliminating illegal conditions even after
institutions are found liable).
238. Cf. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity, supra note 216, at 1329 (discussing the extent to
which injunctions are more intrusive and costly than damages remedies for the state).
239. See Sturm, supra note 237, at 670-73 & nn.135-46 (collecting cases); see also Morales
Feliciano v. Roselló González, 13 F. Supp. 2d 151, 212-14 (D.P.R. 1998) (addressing
inadequate medical care).
240. Sturm, supra note 237, at 662.
241. Id. at 663-66.
242. Id. at 681-83. As evidence of how prison administrators view public attention as a
threat, Human Rights Watch has always experienced significantly more difficulty obtaining
access to prisons in the United States as compared with other countries. Id. at 692.
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Eighth Amendment to provide more than prisoners’ basic needs.243
And even after the explosion of prisoners’ rights litigation in the
1970s and 1980s, when federal courts were accused of taking too
interventionist a stance with respect to state prisons, conditions in
prisons were far from optimal.244 Even in 1993, for instance, forty
states and the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands were under court supervision for overcrowding or other
conditions of confinement.245 One-quarter of all jails in the United
States were supervised for crowding issues in 1990, with 30 percent
of jails under court order related to conditions of confinement.246 By
1995, there were thirty-three prison systems under court supervi-
sion regarding overcrowding or general prison conditions, and even
prison systems that were not under court order were “significantly
overcrowded.”247
In addition, many barriers to litigating prison conditions cases
have sprung up in the last decade. So although arguments have
been made in favor of judicial involvement in reforming prisons,248
243. Id. at 675 (“Courts have not interpreted the Eighth Amendment to invalidate outdated
institutions that warehouse inmates, even if levels of violence are predictably higher in those
institutions, as long as inmates receive the basic necessities of life.”).
244. See, e.g., id. at 687-88 nn.216-19 (citing cases throughout the country from the 1980s
and 1990s in which prison officials failed to respond to tuberculosis outbreak and were held
in contempt for noncompliance with consent decrees, correctional institutions were
condemned as unsanitary and dangerous, food services were determined to present a health
risk, medical services were found inadequate, psychiatric services were deemed nonexistent,
heating and cooling equipment was found insufficient, and the safety of inmates was
threatened by recurrent violence). Recently, prisons have faced potentially deadly outbreaks
of MRSA, due in part to unsanitary conditions. See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Infections in Correctional
Facilities—Georgia, California, and Texas, 2001-2003, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 992 (2003) (reporting on investigations of transmission among Georgia, California, and
Texas prisoners); Mark Spencer, State Probe of MRSA Cases at Prison Requested, HARTFORD
COURANT, Sept. 10, 2008, at B6 (reporting on dozens of prisoners infected with MRSA in
Connecticut state prisons); Ann Coppola, Super-Scary Superbugs, CORRECTIONS.COM (Mar.
3, 2008), http://www.corrections.com/news/article/17883 (reporting on outbreak of MRSA in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, jail);  Kelly Virella, Releasing the Disease, CHI. READER (Oct. 11, 2007),
http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/releasing-the-disease/Content?oid=926087 (reporting
on MRSA outbreak in Cook County Jail).
245. Sturm, supra note 237, at 641.
246. Id. at 641-42. As of 1993, the problems in jails had not received as much attention as
the problems in prisons, even though jails probably had more serious problems. Id. at 697-98.
247. Haney, supra note 121, at 268-69 (citing figures from the ACLU’s National Prison
Project).
248. E.g., Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial
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those arguments appear to have less force in the face of the PLRA,
which limits the power of federal courts to enter remedial orders.249
The result has been a turn to individual damages actions, in some
instances, and a decline in broad institutional reform litigation in
favor of more precise and tailored conditions litigation.250 With the
relatively limited recent success of prison conditions litigation, it is
worth asking whether there are alternative ways to obtain relief for
prisoners who continue to experience debilitating conditions of
confinement.
The remedy of release may be one such approach, especially if
focused on those cases in which abusive conditions of confinement
are the result of widespread practices, policies, and customs. In the
federal system and many state systems, the funds used to pay
damages claims come from a general appropriation that does not
have any impact on the prison system’s overall budget—defendant
prison officials rarely pay damage awards directly.251 Thus, the
availability of monetary damages may provide little deterrent effect
in the prison context.252 But if prisoners are awarded release when
Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 846-47 (1990) (arguing that courts are well-
positioned to be involved in significant intervention because they are independent from
political influences, provide external norms, possess the power to distribute rewards and
penalties to prison officials, have the potential to expose prison systems to public scrutiny,
and can give well-intentioned, reform-minded participants cover to make change).
249. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006). State analogs to the federal PLRA have been passed as well.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-106-201 to -204 (2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1181-:1191
(2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.5501-.5531 (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 566.4 (West
2011).
250. See generally Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of
Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 555 (2006) (describing this change and
arguing that it is a result of a more conservative federal bench, a shift in the attitude toward
causation generally, and a rise of the large-firm approach to litigation). Some of the decline
may be attributable to greater judicial deference to prison administrators, the inculcation of
the norms established in the first wave of litigation, and the need to devote resources to
monitoring the litigation that has been successful to date. See Sturm, supra note 237, at 699-
706, 711-12, 724-28. This is not to say that institutional reform litigation is no longer effective.
Litigators have had more success, for instance, challenging inadequate medical and
psychiatric care in recent years. Litigation ranges from wholesale challenges in California,
see Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1087-88 (N.D. Cal. 2008), to specific
challenges to the provision of treatment for Hepatitis C in Oregon, see, e.g., Release &
Settlement Agreement at 2-3, Anstett v. Oregon, No. 3:01-cv-1619-BR (D. Or. August 21,
2007) and New York, see Hilton v. Wright, 235 F.R.D. 40, 44, 54-55 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
251. See, e.g., Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1982) (describing
payment from state treasury).
252. See generally Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1680-83
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a prison system as operated causes their inhumane treatment, the
pressures on high-level prison officials to avoid such release orders
would be intense. High-level prison officials are likely to have a
greater stake in the institutional reputation of the corrections
system, and release of offenders because of system-wide policies
threatens that reputation. Thus, in certain extreme cases, release
is an appropriate remedy that may better accomplish the deterrent
goals of damages litigation than monetary damages.
One might fear that the remedy of release is so drastic that courts
would not only hesitate to provide it; they would rather cut back on
the reach of Eighth Amendment doctrine in all cases—even those in
which release was not on the table—because of the concern for the
remedial consequences. Yet John Jeffries has suggested the reverse:
that courts are more willing to award forward-looking injunctive
relief than backward-looking damages, precisely because damages
litigation is personal to the governmental defendant.253 Needless to
say, it is difficult to predict whether judges would take the remedial
consequences into account when announcing Eighth Amendment
doctrine, even in cases in which release was not an available
remedy. But it is fair to say that because release is already a
remedy in some Eighth Amendment contexts, it is not obvious that
doctrine will be marginally affected by expanding the areas in which
the remedy is available.
There also may be some practical problems to consider in
effectuating the remedy of release. There is a more specific law
of remedies associated with Preiser v. Rodriguez,254 Heck v.
Humphrey,255 and their progeny that applies in constitutional cases
brought by prisoners and also must be addressed. Under this
jurisprudence, it is well established that a prisoner must use a
(2003) (arguing that although correctional agencies feel some deterrent effect of publicized
litigation and damage awards, officials are likely to be “influenced by litigation’s incentives
only when liability reduction coincides with professional norms”); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths
and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1026-30 (2010) (demonstrating that law enforcement agencies rarely
internalize information documented through damages lawsuits).
253. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 289-90
(2000); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87,
90 (1999).
254. 411 U.S. 475, 488-99 (1973).
255. 512 U.S. 477, 480-87 (1994).
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habeas challenge instead of § 1983 when a prisoner seeks injunctive
relief that calls into question the fact of conviction or the length of
sentence.256 Challenges to conditions of confinement, by contrast,
may be brought pursuant to § 1983.257 Section 1983 literally would
apply to a claim for equitable relief, but its general language might
yield to habeas in situations like those presented here.
The Supreme Court has not considered the Preiser-Heck issue in
light of the remedial proposal made here, and the Court’s holdings
and reasoning are clearly in tension. In Wilkinson v. Dotson, the
Court summarized the relevant cases and concluded that § 1983 is
inappropriate “if success in that action would necessarily demon-
strate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”258 The live
question, then, is whether a § 1983 action seeking the remedy
proposed here falls within this category of cases in which habeas
relief is the exclusive remedy. Several reasons counsel against such
a conclusion. First, success would not “necessarily” demonstrate the
invalidity of the original sentence. Indeed, under the remedy
proposed here, the original sentence would remain valid and the
question would be how to best effectuate that original sentence
given the intervening post-sentence unconstitutional treatment.
Release as a remedy for unconstitutional conditions of confinement
would not invalidate the sentence, and thus the comity and fed-
eralism concerns at the heart of the Preiser-Heck line would not be
implicated.259 Second, there will at least be certain circumstances
when, as proposed, release will be a remedy only if the plaintiff is
unable to obtain money damages, continued confinement is deemed
disproportionate to the crime of conviction, or the constitutional
mistreatment is a result of governmental policy, custom, or practice.
Not every claim of an Eighth Amendment violation will necessarily
fall into these categories.
The Court has recognized that the line between cases challenging
conditions of confinement and cases that fall within the core of
habeas is gray. In Nelson v. Campbell, the Court treated a challenge
256. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489; see also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004).
257. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 643; Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam);
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498-99.
258. 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
259. E.g., Preiser, 411 U.S. at 491-92; Brian M. Hoffstadt, The Deconstruction and
Reconstruction of Habeas, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1167 & n.182 (2005).
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to a specific means of effectuating a death sentence as falling on the
§ 1983 line because it “does not directly call into question the ‘fact’
or ‘validity’ of the sentence itself.”260 The Court reasoned that even
though a declaration that a particular means of execution is uncon-
stitutional affects the power of the State to carry out the sentence
in a timely fashion and imposes additional burdens on the State, the
State could still choose to effectuate the ultimate sentence in a
different way.261 Like in Nelson, an action seeking the remedy of
release does not challenge the validity of the original sentence, but
merely asks the court to recognize that the sentence itself has
changed by virtue of the treatment the offender has received while
in prison. Challenging this treatment by asking for release does not
undermine the validity of the original conviction or sentence; it just
confirms that the State may not carry out that sentence in an un-
constitutional fashion.
If, by contrast, the State indicated that it would not operate its
prison system in any way but an unconstitutional one or would only
carry out the sentence in an unconstitutional way, then habeas
might be more appropriate.262 But when the administration of a
challenged sentence—much like the method of execution—is not
mandated by statute or regulation, the State presumably could
carry it out in a different way.263
Very few lower court cases have addressed the particular problem
raised here, and almost all have arisen in the context of the
potential for future harm. Many have considered § 1983 to be the
appropriate vehicle for raising such a challenge.264 Some lower
260. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644 (emphasis added).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 645.
263. Id. at 646.
264. See Walker v. Lockhart, 713 F.2d 1378, 1383 (8th Cir. 1983) (adjudicating claim that
Arkansas prisons posed undue risk to safety under § 1983). Walker has been read by many
courts to support a § 1983 claim for transfer when a prisoner could establish a high risk of
threat of injury from officers or other prisoners. See, e.g., Moore v. Hoeven, No. 3:08-cv-50,
2008 WL 4844130, at *5 (D.N.D. Nov. 5, 2008) (noting that removal from prison to another
facility “would be available only in rare and extreme circumstances, where there is unusually
high risk of physical danger to an inmate”); see also Abbott v. Petrovsky, 717 F.2d 1191, 1192
(8th Cir. 1983) (concluding that in view of the difficulties in dealing with a high profile
prisoner, the Bureau of Prison’s consideration of alternatives and decision to transfer him to
a particular prison was not unreasonable) (“If future developments demonstrate that Abbott
is not adequately protected at Marion, or if better alternatives become available, prison
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courts, on the other hand, have suggested that a request for a
transfer from one prison to another should be considered under
habeas, even when the request is to remedy previous unconstitu-
tional violations.265 Even if lower courts consider habeas to be the
most appropriate procedural device by which to enforce the remedy
of release, however, this changes the form, but not the function, of
the remedy. It still will have the potential to have a deterrent effect
and it still will function, in some cases, to better equalize the
treatment of offenders subjected to unconstitutional punishment.
There may be difficult res judicata questions to consider if a
prisoner wants to pursue both a damages remedy and the remedy
of release, but courts will not have to create new doctrine to police
those lines.
CONCLUSION
The remedy proposed here for discrete Eighth Amendment
violations—release or a reduction in total period of confinement
—has never been seriously considered by courts or advocates, for
insufficient reasons. If it is ultimately adopted, it may have limited
application. It might properly be narrowly applied to those instances
in which prisoners are subjected to abuse as a result of systemic
officials should reevaluate his situation.”); Streeter v. Hopper, 618 F.2d 1178, 1181-82 (5th
Cir. 1980) (holding in a § 1983 case that the district court properly ordered plaintiff prisoners
removed from a prison where they faced a serious threat of injury from officers and other
prisoners; defendants were given latitude to select the prison to which plaintiffs were
transferred “where their safety could be assured”); Kidd v. Perry, No. 9:10cv57, 2010 WL
2990942, at *1, *3 (E.D. Tex. July 23, 2010) (finding that a transfer under the authority of
Streeter was not in order because “the Court cannot say at this juncture that all options
within the Texas prison system have been exhausted and that nothing remains other than a
transfer to another system” where safety could be assured).
265. See, e.g., Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1112 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that when a
prisoner sought to be transferred to remedy previous constitutional violations, the claim for
relief sounded in habeas corpus); Abdul-Hakeem v. Koehler, No. 89 Civ. 3142 (MBM), 1989
WL 85173, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 1989) (distinguishing Walker and Streeter and holding
that “any prisoner who seeks or wishes to avoid transfer from one form of confinement to
another should have his suit treated as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, especially where
the government defendants request it”). But see Fisher v. Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140, 168
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding in a § 1983 case that when a prisoner alleged that officers had raped
and sexually abused her, the prisoner “must establish irreparable harm and a clear or
substantial likelihood of success on the merits” to obtain an order of transfer to a federal
prison or to another prison in New York or elsewhere).
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policies, customs, or practices. It might also be limited by courts’
ability to determine the commensurability of particular abusive
treatment and particular lengths of confinement. Although radical
on its face, the remedy of release is consistent with both Eighth
Amendment precedent and punishment theory, and it should be
considered part of the menu of choices for courts and advocates
struggling with the difficult task of enforcing Eighth Amendment
norms within prisons.
